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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

COOPERATION KEY TO SOLUTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES PROBLEM

Budapest KULPOLITIKA in Hungarian No 2, 1977 pp 79-92

[Article by Rudolf Joo: "The Nationalities Question in European Inter-State Documents Since 1945" preceded by English summary by editors of KULPOLITIKA, entitled: "The National Minorities Problem in Post-1945 Interstate Documents"]

[Text] This is a survey of post-war bilateral and multi-lateral documents issued by states which, in whole or in part, deal with the protection of national minorities.

With the exception of the Italian peace-treaty the others which concluded the Second World War did not contain special provisions relating to the protection of minorities. Much like in the UN Charter, general human rights and political liberties, as well as the prohibition of discrimination found expression there.

National minorities as defined social groups are only specially protected by the September 5th 1946 South Tyrol Agreement, the October 5th 1954 Trieste Agreement, and the May 15th 1955 Austrian State Treaty, Specific protection of national minorities is the subject of the March 29th 1955 West German-Danish joint statement referring to the mixed Danish and German population of Schleswig-Holstein.

The first interstate document signed by the socialist countries of Europe in which national minorities protection is specifically mentioned was the Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed on March 10th 1957. Beginning with the second half of the sixties the protection of national minorities is often mentioned in the joint communiques issued after bilateral negotiations between representatives of socialist countries. No legal obligations are thereby entailed, but their political weight is nevertheless considerable. They raise the most important minorities policy principles of the signatory countries to international status.

The Eastern European historical and geographical features of the minorities question, a shared history, and more important a shared socio-political present makes such communiques and statements both possible and necessary. Mutual interest and reciprocity are an important precondition, that is the fact that there are minorities in both countries which, owing to linguistic and cultural reasons consider the other to be their "mother country."

The second part of the article deals with European regional agreements and statements which include points defending national minorities, such as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the defence of basic liberties and the Final Document of the 1975 European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

In this study we will review those bilateral and multilateral interstate documents¹ which have come into being in Europe since World War II which have as their object, in part or in whole, the protection of national minorities or nationalities.²

From the viewpoint of our theme we must make a distinction between "nationalities which have a mother country" (e.g. the South Slavs of Austria, the Hungarians in Yugoslavia, the Germans in Hungary) and the so-called "nationalities without states" (e.g. the Scots, Catalans, Basques). The distinction is essential because for the most part it is only the first group which appears as a real interstate problem while for the second group of nationalities, lacking a "mother nation," only regulation by multilateral and universal documents can provide a standard.

The minority-nationality problem is a world phenomenon. We find few states on our Earth where the linguistic-ethnic borders coincide with the political legal borders. At the same time, for a number of historical, political and diplomatic reasons, the great majority of the minority protection agreements dating from between the two world wars and the majority of the minority agreements born (or remaining) after World War II pertain to European states. For this reason we will concentrate our examination on this continent.

We must mention, however, two of the most important minority protection agreements outside of Europe: the Indian-Pakistani agreement signed in April 1950 which was called on to quiet the Hindu-Muslim hostility following the separation of the two states and the 1959 Zurich and London agreements pertaining to Cyprus which Greece and Turkey signed to settle nationality relations of the state of Cyprus when it became independent. The execution of both agreements has been suspended due to the greatly deteriorated relations of the interested states in the meantime and for other causes (e.g. the Turkish occupation of a part of Cyprus).

1. Bilateral and Multilateral Interstate Agreements and Statements

a. Minority Protection Agreements Which Came Into Being Between the Two World Wars and Remained in Effect After 1945

In 1950, at the request of the UN Secretariat, the minority protection sub-committee of the Human Rights Committee of the world organization examined the validity of the minority agreements signed after World War I. The examination and the report prepared on it³ in essence answered negatively the question as to whether the international minority treaties and declarations signed between 1920 and 1932 were in force.

Summarizing the arguments of the report, which stressed political rather than legal positions, the agreements in question were declared invalid as a result of "changes in general circumstances" (border changes, states ceasing to exist, exchanges of populations, etc.). Because circumstances had not fundamentally changed the UN regarded two minority agreements as being still in effect: an agreement with Finland pertaining to the island of Aaland and the Lausanne Agreement obliging Turkey to protect minorities.

The Aaland Agreement (27 June 1921)

Finland became independent in 1917. At the end of World War I the victorious Entente Powers decided the boundaries of Finland in such a way that the Aaland Island group, lying between the coasts of Finland and Sweden and consisting of more than 10,000 islands [sic] inhabited almost exclusively by Swedes, came under Finnish authority. At the initiative of the Council of the League of Nations Finland and Sweden began direct talks about a special status for the islands.

The Aaland Agreement was born as a result of these discussions. Among other things it obliged the Finnish state to preserve the self-administration and Swedish cultural character of the islands. In harmony with this the Finnish parliament passed a law in 1921 pertaining to the 21,000 Swedish inhabitants of the island group. The law proclaiming autonomy made possible, among other things, the creation on the islands of a local parliament, executive power and administration. It provided for public education and public administration in the Swedish language alone; it restricted Finnish immigration and offered effective guarantees for the realization of local economic interests. These provisions remained unchanged after World War II. In December 1951 a new law⁴ of the Finnish parliament pertaining to the islands further expanded the already existing governmental independence and practically ended the veto power of the republic president over the decisions of the Landsting, the local parliament.

Finland recognizes the continuing validity of the Aaland agreement. Since World War II there has been no incident worthy of note between Sweden and Finland in regard to execution of the agreement.

The Minority Protection Articles of the Lausanne Agreement (24 July 1923)

The Lausanne Agreement of 1923 bears witness to the strengthened internal and international positions of the reborn Turkish state if it is compared to the 1920 draft peace treaty of Sevres which would have meant the dismemberment of

Turkey and its foreign subordination. Those minority protection obligations which Turkey assumed in this agreement represented much smaller burdens than the invalidated Sevres peace held in prospect.

The minority protection articles of the Lausanne Agreement set forth the nationality and religious rights of the non-Muslim inhabitants of Turkey; they guarantee them complete freedom of movement and emigration. Not only do they prescribe the possibility of education in the mother tongue but they also provide for a proportional share of the national and local budget. At the time the agreement was signed about 13 percent of the population of Turkey belonged to some minority (Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, etc.). As a result of emigration and assimilation this ratio can be put today at 7-8 percent.

Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty ("the rights given to the non-Muslim minorities of Turkey will be given by Greece in the same manner to the Muslim minority on its territory"⁵) extends the power of the minority protection provisions to Greece and thus "bilateralizes the appropriate articles of the treaty.

b. The Minority Protection Provisions of the Peace Treaties Following World War II

On 10 February 1947 at the 21-power conference being held in Paris to prepare the peace treaties the Council of Foreign Ministers submitted the text of the treaties to representatives of the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Italian and Finnish states.

With the exception of the Italian peace treaty--the signing of which was delayed due to the problem of Trieste--the peace treaties signed with the other former wartime allies of Germany did not contain special minority protection provisions. As in the UN Charter they did contain a formulation of general human rights and political freedoms, and a principle banning discrimination, which figures in all five treaties with a virtually identical text. The corresponding point of the Hungarian peace treaty reads: "Hungary further obligates itself to make no distinction in the content or application of laws valid in Hungary among persons of Hungarian citizenship on the basis of their race, sex, language or religion."⁶

Only the Hungarian peace treaty refers to the nationality question (Article 5) but not here either with a protective character but rather in connection with emphasizing the "possibility of discussions." "Hungary will begin discussions with Czechoslovakia concerning the problem of those inhabitants of Hungarian origin who were not transferred to Hungary in accordance with the exchange of population provisions of 27 February 1946."⁷

In the peace treaties mentioned we find an example of positive minority protection containing specific rights only in the Italian-Austrian agreement on the South Tyrol attached to the Italian peace treaty.

c. The Agreement on the South Tyrol⁸ (5 September 1946)

An agreement came into being on 5 September 1946 between the Austrian and Italian sides pertaining to the special status of the province of Bolzano (Bozen) inhabited by a German-language minority. The bilateral agreement was later attached to the Italian peace treaty signed in 1947 and became a full valued part thereof.

The Saint Germain peace of 1919 attached the South Tyrol, inhabited by a German-language majority, to Italy. After Italian fascism came to power the regime of Mussolini conducted a policy of methodical assimilation and immigration in the area. In return for Italian foreign policy concessions in connection with the Anschluss an agreement signed by Hitler and Mussolini on 23 June 1939 was aimed at a "final solution" of the problem, arranging for a continual removal of the German-language population to the Third Reich. Between 1939 and 1945 some 75,000 Tyroleans moved to Germany. The war slowed the pace of the transfer and execution of the agreement was suspended by the fascist capitulation.

After World War II Austria found the international constellation favorable for bringing up the South Tyrol question as a territorial demand against Italy. The majority of the victorious powers rejected the demand; at the same time they supported the initiation of direct bilateral discussions between Italy and Austria to settle the Tyrolean problem.

The agreement which grew out of the discussions consists of three main parts: the first part proclaims the complete equality of the German and Italian languages in the province in education, public usage, employment, etc. The second part prescribes the creation of an autonomous zone with its own legislative and executive organs. The third part invalidates the 1939 Hitler-Mussolini agreement and makes possible the restoration of Italian citizenship to those who desire it. It also liberalizes the movement of people and goods along the border and makes a proposal for the mutual recognition of university degrees.

Informed by a strongly leftist and democratic spirit the 1948 Italian constitution guaranteed broad autonomy to provinces with historical and national peculiarities and thus to Bolzano too, which has 260,000 German-language inhabitants. But a later administrative reform united Bolzano to the almost exclusively Italian province of Trento and the zone of Trentino-Alto-Adige thus formed, with a strong Italian majority, received the self-government cited. Further violations of nationality rights in education, state employment, etc. became known in the 1950's.⁹

The Italian assimilation policy produced a great wave of terror in the South Tyrol and activated Austrian diplomacy which, citing the Italian peace treaty, requested member states in the United Nations, the Council of Europe¹⁰ and other international forums to take urgent steps against the Italian government in the early 1960's.

The Tyrolean question severely damaged relations between Austria and Italy in the 1960's. At the repeated initiative of the United Nations the two neighboring states put direct discussions of the matter of the German-language

minority on the agenda beginning in 1964 but a concrete agreement was born only at a meeting of the two foreign ministers in Copenhagen in 1969. According to the joint communique issued at the time the 30 November 1969 agreement of Italian Foreign Minister Moro and Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim closed an old phase and opened a new one in the matter of the South Tyrol and in Italian-Austrian relations in general.¹¹ Internal political steps followed the agreement; on 4 and 5 December 1969 respectively the Italian house of representatives and senate accepted by majority vote the proposal of the government "concerning measures to be taken in the interest of the population of Alto-Adige." As a result of these measures the autonomy of the province of Bolzano, with a German majority, was increased within the zone of Alto-Adige in economic-financial and in linguistic-cultural respects.

d. The Trieste Agreement (5 October 1954)

The signing of the Italian peace treaty was delayed primarily because a difference of views erupted among the great powers in the question of Trieste. The leading states of the anti-fascist coalition agreed that Trieste should be a free city and this was confirmed by the United Nations. But they could not agree on the person of the governor of the city. The status of Trieste was not finally settled after the signing of the Italian peace treaty either and so English and American forces continued to be stationed in the city while Yugoslav troops were stationed in the so-called B Zone around it until the problem was finally settled in 1954, essentially to the benefit of Italy.

On 8 October 1953 the governments of the United States and Great Britain sent a memorandum pertaining to Trieste to the Italian and Yugoslav governments. The memorandum expressed "deep anxiety about the worsening of relations between the two countries"¹² the cause of which was the Trieste dispute. It emphasized the temporary character of the Anglo-American presence in the area and that this must be soon replaced by a final civil administration. It informed the two interested governments of the decision "to transfer to the Italian government administration of the A Zone, considering its decisively Italian character."

The memorandum of 1953 was followed by a four-power agreement signed on 4 October 1954 which discussed the Trieste question as a question of sovereign relations between Italy and Yugoslavia (border traffic, organizing transportation, use of the port, etc.). Considering the mixed Italian and Yugoslav population of the area (about 27,000 Yugoslavs lived in the Italian area and about 18,000 Italians lived in the Yugoslav zone) a special chapter dealt with regulating nationality relations (the right to create minority organizations, use of the mother tongue in public life and education, etc.).¹⁴

A Yugoslav-Italian mixed committee was created to vouch for the agreement pertaining to the special nationality status of Trieste; this committee was authorized to examine complaints of nationalities (individuals or organizations) living in the two zones. Italy and Yugoslavia undertook in the agreement to aid the work of the committee with the tools at their disposal.

Despite the 1954 agreement Trieste has often caused tension in Italian-Yugoslav relations during the past 20 years. Extreme rightwing Italian groups have raised the question from time to time rather as a border problem than as a nationality question; nationality complaints have caused friction only rarely. Changes in Yugoslav-Italian relations have not influenced fundamentally the execution of the nationality prescriptions of the Trieste agreement; both countries have turned great attention to maintaining these and the mixed committee has been able to do its work without disturbance.

The two governments have regularly held high-level diplomatic discussions, since the Italian-Yugoslav foreign ministers' meeting in Venice in February 1971, concerning recurring problems connected with the port of Trieste and the sea border. As a result of these--and to no small degree as a result of the European security and cooperation conference--an Italian-Yugoslav border agreement came into being in September 1975 the eighth point of which¹⁵ reaffirms the minority protection provisions of the 1954 Trieste agreement. Another paragraph proclaims the equality of the Italian and Serbo-Croatian languages in the two zones and renews the mandate of the Yugoslav-Italian mixed committee.

e. The Austrian State Treaty (15 May 1955)

The 15 May 1955 Austrian State Treaty restoring the sovereignty of Austria also contains important minority protection provisions. The statehood of Austria was abolished in 1938, it was not formally at war with the Allies, and so no peace treaty had to be signed with it. But the four-power talks concerning the restoration of Austrian statehood reached a dead-end after 1948 and could be resumed only in 1954-1955 in a general period of more lively east-west contacts.

The treaty which came into being between the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France and Austria gives detailed international guarantees to the Croatian and Slovene nationalities living in Austria.¹⁶ (The number of Croats living in Burgenland was about 25,000 in 1971 while the number of Slovenes living in Carinthia and Styria was about 20,000.) In addition to the South Slavs there are still Czechs and Slovaks--about 10,000 people combined--and people of Hungarian nationality--about 6,000 people--living in Austria but the provisions of the treaty noted below do not apply to them.

Article 6 of the state treaty contains a ban on racial, sexual, linguistic and religious discrimination. But subpoint 5 of Article 7 goes further: it lists in detail those concrete nationality rights which the Croats and Slovenes enjoy as individuals or as groups. Article 26 of the state treaty contains reparation provisions for victims of Nazi persecution, primarily Jews and other persecuted groups.

Like the Trieste Agreement the Austrian State Treaty makes possible and protects the right of individuals belonging to a minority or of their organizations to appeal to international forums. The guarantee has both a political and a legal nature. In the case of a complaint the Slovene and Croatian minorities can make use first of all of the classic mechanism of defense guaranteed by the

treaty. If this is without result the question can be referred to the chiefs of the diplomatic missions of the four allied powers who will discuss the matter directly with the Austrian government.

A number of federal and provincial regulations since 1955 (such as the 14 April 1959 school law pertaining to Carinthia) have "transferred" the international obligations of the state treaty into the internal Austrian legal system. Despite the detailed legal provisions there have been an increasing number of complaints by Austria's South Slav minorities, primarily the Slovenes, since the end of the 1950's. In 1960 a complaint of the Carinthian Slovene minority went before the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe.¹⁷ Since 1961 the federal government of Yugoslavia, citing the Austrian state treaty, has sent a number of protest notes to the Austrian government. The Slovene government and national assembly took a stand in a similar note in regard to the Carinthian Slovenes.

Yugoslavia regards it as a violation of the Austrian state treaty that the granting of nationality rights should be linked to the proportional number of the minorities and that various nationalist Austrian organizations can conduct anti-Slovene and anti-Yugoslav activity in the country. The Yugoslav government does not consider satisfactory the answering note of the Austrian government and its measures such as the creation of a nationalities advisory body. The difference in view between the two states in regard to nationality policy reached a peak on the occasion of the November 1976 language census. The bilateral and general international conditions for a lasting settlement acceptable to all interested parties have improved somewhat since 1976.

f. The Minority Protection Declaration of the FRG and the Danish Governments (29 March 1955)

The mixed--Danish and German--population of Schleswig-Holstein has developed as the result of centuries of history, primarily as a result of the frequent border changes between Germany and Denmark.

Following World War II about 23,000 German nationality inhabitants remained in Denmark and almost 35,000 of Danish nationality remained in West Germany.

On 29 March 1955 the FRG and Danish governments, repeating similar diplomatic steps taken in 1949, published simultaneously two almost identical declarations concerning the situation of the Danish or German national minorities.¹⁸

The two declarations deal in detail with the political and cultural rights of persons belonging to the minorities. They contain the right to create nationality schools and organizations for political, cultural or economic purposes and prescribe proportional legislative representation of minorities and the possibility for direct contacts with the mother country.

The United States played an active intermediary role in bringing about the declarations, in both 1949 and 1955. In accordance with its world strategic

goals the United States sees in these declarations a tool for the unity of the western alliance system and for the political emancipation of the FRG.

In both cases the Danish government stuck to the "declaration" form in contrast to the proposal of the West German government, which would have preferred to sign a treaty. Naturally there were substantive reasons for this; Denmark thus wanted to distance itself from the more serious international obligations which would accompany the signing of a bilateral agreement or treaty. Despite the "declaration" form the principles established by the two countries do have legal force. Since it came into existence the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe has supervised their realization and has investigated minority complaints arising. Thus far the more serious criticism in connection with execution has come from the Danish side. Denmark has noted officially that the West German 5 per cent "electoral clause" seriously violates the right of the Danish nationality to proportional political representation.¹⁹

g. Documents Between European Socialist Countries Pertaining to Nationality Protection

The first international document of the socialist community which developed in the years following World War II, a document which was connected with protection of nationalities too, was the Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid signed on 10 March 1947. A separate protocol attached to the Polish-Czechoslovak treaty dealt with protection of the 21,000 person Slovak nationality in Poland and 72,000 Poles in Tesin guaranteeing special rights to the minorities as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that within the frameworks provided by law and on the basis of reciprocity they should ensure to the Poles in Czechoslovakia and to the Slovaks and Czechs in Poland the possibility for national political, cultural and economic development (schools, associations and federations within the social organizations of Czechoslovakia and Poland)."²⁰

Beginning with the second half of the 1960's the joint communiques and declarations which are issued concerning bilateral discussions between representatives of socialist states constitute unique tools for the protection of nationalities. These documents do not contain legal obligations but still they have significant political importance; the most important nationality policy principles of the signatory countries are raised to an inter-state level.

The historical and geographic peculiarities of the nationality question in eastern Europe, the common historical past and especially the common social and political present make these statements possible and necessary. Mutual interests, reciprocity and the fact that nationalities live in both countries which regard the other country as the "mother country" because of their linguistic-cultural characteristics are important conditions for them to come into being.

In order of time we find the first example of documents setting down nationality policy principles in Hungarian-Yugoslav contacts. An emphasis on the positive linking role of the nationalities, and the necessity of a principled policy

toward them are constant elements, from the second half of the 1960's on, in joint communiques issued concerning Hungarian-Yugoslav meetings at various levels. We might mention as one of the most important examples the communique issued on the meeting of Janos Kadar and Josip Broz Tito 28-30 April 1974 which expresses appreciation for the significance of the nationalities as follows:

"The two sides emphasized the significance and role of the South Slavs in Hungary--the Croat, Slovene and Serb nationalities--and of the Hungarian nationality in Yugoslavia in developing the friendly contacts of the two countries. Experiences thus far show that every practical step taken to benefit the nationalities has contributed to making more profound the friendship of our peoples."²¹

A communique issued concerning talks in Budapest in February 1977 between the Hungarian and Yugoslav foreign ministers contains the following formulation:

"On this occasion also they emphasized in their conversations the significance of the Hungarian nationality living in Yugoslavia and of the Croat, Serb and Slovene nationalities living in Hungary in making more profound the friendship of the two peoples, in strengthening mutual trust and in strengthening our relations and mutual understanding. They expressed their readiness to devote attention in the future also to mutual aid for nationality educational and cultural development as part of cultural and educational cooperation between the two countries."²²

In Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations the nationality question figured for the first time in a joint communique issued on the September 1970 visit to Hungary of the Czechoslovak foreign minister. "The ministers established with satisfaction that relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are developing successfully on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism. The life of Slovaks living in Hungary and of Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia is developing in the spirit of these principles and this strengthens the friendship of the two socialist countries."²³

The joint communique on the Budapest talks in April 1976 of premiers Gyorgy Lazar and Lubomir Strougal puts it this way: "The correct Lenin solution of the nationality question in the Hungarian People's Republic and in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic contributes to strengthening and consolidating friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the two countries."²⁴

In addition to the above we find in Romanian-Yugoslav relations an example of reference to nationality protection in inter-state documents. The communique which appeared concerning the Tito-Ceausescu meeting of 10-14 July 1974 notes among other things that "the life of the Serb and Croat national minorities in the Romanian Socialist Republic is the result of historical development and many centuries of being neighbors."

"The correct solution of the national question in the two countries, ensuring the equal rights and many-sided development of the nationalities, is an important

factor in socialist construction in Romania and Yugoslavia and in strengthening their friendly contacts. The two sides feel that such a solution corresponds to the spirit of international rules too, rules which the United Nations has adopted in regard to the progress of and protection of the rights of national minorities."²⁵

In the realization and materialization of nationality rights an important task falls on the cultural agreements of the socialist states. Since it would be difficult to realize the many-sided cultural-educational development of the nationalities without the effective support of the mother countries the cultural cooperation plans between the socialist countries must contain nationality points too. The agreements either mention nationality policy cooperation themes *expresis verbis* or they contain general formulations when listing educational-cultural possibilities offered the citizens of the other country so that the formulas mentioned can be interpreted as applying to the nationalities too.

Cultural agreements between socialist countries are of great significance in general in fixing cultural rights at the inter-state level. Taken together the bilateral agreements constitute a system which is equivalent to a regional regulation in regard to cultural rights.²⁶ In addition one could also imagine in principle the creation of a separate regional agreement among socialist countries pertaining to cultural rights which could include a joint determination of socialist nationality policy and legal principles.

2. Regional Agreements and Declarations

a. The Council of Europe and Protection of National Minorities

The Council of Europe, bringing together the majority of the capitalist countries of western Europe, came into existence on 5 May 1949 and it operates right up to our day as one of the important elements of the institutional system embracing the western half of the continent. In November 1950 the member states of the Council approved a "Convention Concerning Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms."

In essence this regional agreement is limited to listing classic civil rights and thus in content it represents a step backward as compared to the Universal Declaration of the United Nations.

The convention does not contain special minority protection provisions. Point 14 of it does mention "those belonging to national minorities"²⁷ but this point defends this group of citizens from discrimination and disadvantageous distinctions.

Point 25 of the agreement, at the same time, does make it possible for "every person and every non-governmental organ and other unique group who regards itself as the victim of a violation of rights contained in the convention"²⁸ to turn with its complaint to the supervisory organs of the convention, to the European Committee on Human Rights (which consists of one representative from

each of the states participating in the Agreement) or to the European Court for Human Rights (representatives of the member states of the Council of Europe). Thus this formulation makes it possible for not only the "mother countries" but also for nationality organizations, groups and even private individuals to turn to these institutions with their complaints.

It might be noted that thus far Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Turkey have not recognized the right of the committee to examine cases submitted by private persons. France, Switzerland and Malta have not yet ratified the agreement.

The minority protection applicability of the convention is further limited by the fact that point 14 cannot be applied independently; a complaint can be raised in case of violation only if one can prove a "linked" violation of another point of the agreement.

Despite the reservations and limitations the Legal Committee and Court of the Council of Europe have examined and taken stands in a number of nationality complaint cases since they were formed. The work of the committee in this regard is substantially facilitated by the already existing interstate agreements and declarations, the South Tyrol and the Trieste agreements, the Austrian state treaty and the Danish-West German declaration. It is not by chance that the majority of the investigations have been directed to these areas which have been "put in order" politically and diplomatically.²⁹ In addition to what has been mentioned the committee has been concerned most often with the Flemish-Walloon language conflict in Belgium, nationality and linguistic problems connected with regionalization of the country. Of the nationality complaints examined by the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe only two have been accepted (both were Belgian cases); Austria found the petition connected with the South Tyrol (No 788/1960) well founded only in part; the other complaints submitted in national-language disputes were rejected as unfounded.³⁰

b. The Final Document of the European Security and Cooperation Conference.
The Question of Minorities at the Geneva Talks 1974-1975

The European Security and Cooperation Conference was an outstanding diplomatic event for the Europe of the years after World War II and represented a new important step forward in the interstate recognition of the minority question. The final document of the conference deals with the problem of national minorities in three places, in the chapters titled "Human Rights and Basic Freedoms," "Cultural Cooperation and Exchange" and "Cooperation and Exchange in the Area of Educational Affairs."

We find the following formula in chapter 1/VII containing human rights and basic freedoms: "The participating states on whose area there are national minorities will honor the rights of persons belonging to these minorities to equality before the law and will guarantee to them in every way the opportunity to actually enjoy human rights and basic freedoms and will in this way protect the legal interests of the national minorities in this area."³¹

The last paragraph of the chapter titled "Cultural Cooperation and Exchange" speaks in this fashion:

"National minorities or regional cultures. The participating states, recognizing that national minorities or regional cultures can contribute to their cooperation in various areas of culture, express their intention to aid this contribution and in-so-far as such minorities or cultures exist on their territory they will take into consideration the just interests of the members of them."³²

The formulation in the last paragraph of the chapter titled "Cooperation and Exchange in the Area of Educational Affairs" is identical in text with the former with the exception of the subject word.

These formulations are the result of a long diplomatic struggle. In the Geneva phase of the European security and cooperation conference the nationality question occupied a relatively significant place in the debates of the subcommittees involved. The result, following from the principle of unanimity, could not be other than a compromise, a part of the compromise system set down by the final document. At the same time the formula thus created provides a suitable framework for execution in good faith, a tool for improving mutual contacts between European states and for enriching multilateral cooperation.

The signatory states adopted the proposals of the final document with the intention of making them an organic part of their political practice and internal legal systems. The process of making the Helsinki proposals a social reality is far from complete today; problems can be experienced in many areas including in the situation of the national minorities and there are a good number of tasks awaiting solution.

Realization of the principles set down in the final document takes place in a continuing diplomatic, political and social struggle as was pointed out by the Berlin conference of European communist and workers' parties. The chapter titled "For The Development of Mutually Advantageous Cooperation, For Better Understanding Among Peoples" of the document issued on the conference calls, among other things, for a struggle "for a precise and full realization by all states of the principles pertaining to national minorities in the Final Act of the Helsinki conference."³³

3. Evaluation of Interstate Documents Pertaining to Protection of Nationalities

As with the codification in the UN so in European interstate contacts we can regard the middle 1960's as approximately a benchmark in the international regulation of the nationality question. The first phase of development was characterized by international agreements connected with the conclusion of the war (South Tyrol, Trieste, the Austrian state treaty or the Polish-Czechoslovak treaty). Beginning with the second half of the 1960's, characteristic of the developing and qualitatively new relations among the interested states, bilateral or regional joint comminiques and declarations came to the

fore. (The Danish-West German government declaration must be included in the former group since realization of it is guaranteed by the legal mechanism of the Council of Europe.)

In contrast to the interstate treaties the joint communiques and declarations (e.g., the Hungarian-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Yugoslav and Romanian-Yugoslav communiques and the final document of the European security and cooperation conference) constitute a new and spreading tool of minority protection in the past decade. They are not documents with international legal force, no mechanism is attached to them which would oblige the signatory states by means of sanctions to hold to the principles in them. At the same time, in the relations of a few states the political-moral weight of the principles made public in this way approaches that of treaties. This is possible primarily in bilateral relations. The basis for their coming into being, the general good relations between the states and the approximately identical interest in maintaining the nationalities, can frequently aid more effectively their realization than legal guarantees worked out in the greatest detail.

It would be a mistake to equate the role played by the nationality question in international documents to the role played by the nationality question in current international relations. The former is only a fraction of the latter, the smaller part pertaining to which the interested states have succeeded in coming to an agreement. Thus the international minority protection documents embody a compromise the limits of which are defined by the current international power relationships and by mutual interest in a principled solution of the problem. These limits, even if there has been backsliding, show a broadening trend; a social demand for international regulation is increasing worldwide and a state-policy spirit proclaiming nationalist isolation, still very strong here and there, can oppose this to an ever lesser degree.

Especially thought-provoking in this connection is the situation of nationalities without a so-called "mother country." The struggle of the Catalan, Basque, Welsh, Breton, Frisian, etc. nationalities for linguistic-cultural identity has developed only in our day into a movement of real political, sometimes even international political, significance. In the past the majority of the western European states denied even the national nature or existence of these minorities. This cannot be maintained at the present level of development and of mass information; despite this we can still find attempts--for example in the preparatory phase of the CSCE and even after the signing of the Final Act--directed at belittling the problem of nationalities "without states." It is shocking that often this is done by those states in whose official and semiofficial statements the question of human rights and political freedoms figures so prominently.

The harmony of an internal and external nationality policy can be realized most fully in socialist relationships. The socialist turning in eastern Europe not only created the possibility for our states to solve the national oppositions inherited from the past by means of internal measures but also for the nationalities to become factors of approach and linkage between our countries and nations. In most of the socialist countries the nationalities have started on the road of becoming integrating factors linking the socialist nations instead of conflict

factors which separated the old states or actually turned them against one another. Significant steps have been taken in this area but if we look at the broader prospects offered by our social system then the socialist community is still only in the initial stage of this developmental process. In the case of minorities beyond the borders of Lenin solution to the nationality question presupposes the close cooperation of the interested states. Fixing nationality policy principles in bilateral or regional international documents is becoming in our day an ever more important condition for cooperation based on the principles of socialist internationalism, citizenship, territorial integrity and nonintervention in internal affairs.

The meetings of Janos Kadar and Nicolae Ceausescu in Debrecen and Nagyvarad [Oradea] on 15 and 16 June 1977 took place after we went to press. The joint communique states the following, among other things, in regard to the nationality question:

"A just Marxist-Leninist solution of the national question and ensuring the legal equality and many-sided development of the nationalities is an essential element of the socialist construction taking place in both countries and for making more profound the friendship between their peoples and friendly Hungarian-Romanian relations. The parties... emphasize the significance of having the nationalities of the two neighboring states play to an ever greater degree the role of bridge in communications between the Hungarian and Romanian peoples." (NEPSZABADSAG, 17 June 1977)

FOOTNOTES

1. By interstate documents we mean interstate agreements with obligatory legal force and joint declarations of political significance.
2. In regard to the interpretation of the concepts of "national minority" and "nationality" see Rudolf Joo: "The UN and Protection of National Minorities," KULPOLITIKA, 1976, No 4, page 60.
3. Study of the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities. Doc. E/CN 4/367.
4. Modeen, Tore: The International Protection of the National Identity of the Aaland Islands. SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW, 1973.
5. Treaties and International Instruments Concerning the Protection of Minorities. E/CN 4/Sub. 2/133. 1951.
6. Hungarian Peace Treaty, Article 2.
7. Hungarian Peace Treaty, Article 5.

8. Gruber-de Gasperi recognized it as an agreement. (See Treaties and International Instruments Concerning the Protection of Minorities. E/CN 3/Sub. 2/133.)
9. Heraud, Guy: L'Autonomie du Tyrol du Sud. REVENUE GENERAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, 1956, No 3.
10. See the official protocol of the 1960 and 1961 debate of the UN General Assembly and the debate concerning petition 788/1960 before the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe.
11. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, 6 December 1969, p 1086.
12. Scritti Sulla Questione di Trieste. Atti internazionali ed interni, pp 388-389.
13. Ibid.
14. See note 5.
15. MEDJUNARODNA POLITIKA, Belgrade, 16 October 1975, p 16.
16. See note 5.
17. Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights. Petition No 808/1960.
18. See note 5.
19. Heraud, Guy: L'Europe des Ethnies, 1973, p 173.
20. Modeen, Tore: The International Protection of National Minorities in Europe. Abo Akademi, 1969, p 93.
21. NEPSZABADSAG, 30 April 1974.
22. NEPSZABADSAG, 3 February 1977.
23. NEPSZABADSAG, 19 September 1970.
24. NEPSZABADSAG, 28 April 1976.
25. ELORE, 14 July 1974.
26. For extended treatment see Imre Szabo: "A kulturális jogok" [Cultural Rights], Economic and Legal Book Publishers, Budapest, 1973, p 135. The final chapter of the book merits special attention from the viewpoint of our theme for it provides a fundamental analysis of the interdependence of cultural rights and the rights of national minorities.

27. Convention de Sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales.
28. Bilan de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme. Conseil de l'Europe. 1973, pp 6-16.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. The Final Act of the CSCE. NEMZETKOZI SZEMLE, 1975, No 10.
32. Ibid.
33. Documents of the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, Kossuth Book Publishers, 1976, p 50.

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DEMANDS OF BILINGUALISM ON HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA EXAMINED

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 24 Jul 77 p 11

[Article by Peter Ruffy: "A Journey Around the Mother Tongue: Transylvanian Bilingualism"]

[Text] 1.

For weeks I tasted and sampled that thick little volume I received from Kolozsvár [Cluj]. "Anyanyelvünk muvelese" [Cultivating Our Mother Tongue] (published by Kriterion, Bucharest) is the first anthology of Transylvanian Hungarian linguistic works published since World War II, articles and studies selected from the columns of the Romanian papers and journals BRASSOI LAPOK, DOLGOZO NO, ELORE, FALVAK DOLGOZO NEPE, HARGITA, IGAZSAG, IGAZ SZO, JOBARAT, KORUNK, MUVELODES, MUNKASELET, MEGYEI TUKOR, SZATMARI HIRLAP, SZABAD SZO, TANUGYI UJSAG, UTUNK, VOROS LOBOGO and VOROS ZASZLO.

The saying that truth in our age consists of details is a profoundly true saying and so I examined the truth which emerged from the details.

I leafed through the volume. Then I read it. Later I made notes. Finally I read it again. And later I again leafed through it. I underlined certain passages. And I read it a third time.

What is involved here, humanly, socially, from the viewpoint of universal, international linguistic science, is not something minor or indifferent but rather a linguistic and scientific question unique in Europe. Thus the close attention and scientific care. For the first time in their history since World War II the Hungarians of Transylvania have faced the problems of bilingualism and there is in Europe today no larger ethnic group or nationality than they which has had to live amidst the historic, social and everyday circumstances of a necessary bilingualism.

Hungarian linguistic science in Hungary and literary and scientific life in general have always reckoned with the great intellectual heritage of Transylvania--the grammar of Janos Sylvester, born in Szinyervaralja, the lives of Hungarian writers by Peter Bod, the orthographic rules of Matyas Deval Biro, the magnificent Kolozsvár [Cluj] press of the writer and

translator Gaspar Heltai, the works and lives of the typecaster Miklos Misztotfalusi Kis and of Janos Apaczai Csere or Samuel Brassai. And celebratory articles have greeted the work of contemporaries in the first volume of the linguistic history of Transylvanian Hungarians--the Szekely, Csango and Transylvanian Hungarian ethnic research of T. Attila Szabo, Gyula Marton and Mozes Galffy, the folk ballads fished from unknown deep waters by Jozsef Farago, the special Ady issue of IGAZ SZO, the heritage of KORUNK, praise for the international work of Gabor Gaal and so much besides.

But what is involved here is not greeting or detailing the great undertakings of linguistic science, not days of celebration but weekdays, not the whole but the details, not such spell-binding undertakings as the linguistic history of Transylvanian Hungarians based on a million "notes" but rather quiet and modest details.

And we can carry out this investigation on the basis of the communications, desires, counsels, statements and facts presented by the authors of this volume.

2.

What new questions does the 3,000-year (Geza Barczi) history of the Hungarian language present in the second half of the 20th century?

In the first half of the 20th century, more precisely between the two world wars, a knowledge of the language of the people organizing the state was not a necessary and indispensable condition for the existence, work and realization of the Hungarian nationality in Romania. Every people has a clear and good moral obligation to master the language of another people living with it but at that time this human, moral requirement was not yet necessary and indispensable. After World War II, in our socialist age, the old moral law became a law of survival, a sine qua non of life and work--the ancient village communities broke up, communal farms were formed, great construction projects began and in their wake came migrations and the movement of the labor force.

I will always indicate what author I am quoting. "A considerable part of the Hungarian people is bilingual.... Hungarian-Romanian bilingualism is widespread among Hungarians in Romania; Hungarian-Slovak bilingualism is found among Hungarians living in Slovakia; and so forth.... Bilingualism is quite widespread among the Csangos in Moldavia too...." And then: "We can speak of bilingualism if the members of the community can communicate with one another in both languages." (Gyula Marton) But then this great Hungarian linguist of Kolozsvar [Cluj], who died a few years ago, continues by noting that the Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union use many foreign technical terms (many of them learned their professions in the language of the country in which they were living) so we must strive to have these experts learn the Hungarian technical terms too. In a nationality existence there must be a daily and mutual exchange

of vocabulary between the language of the people organizing the state and the Hungarian language. For example: "Romanian-Hungarian dictionaries teach that the correct Hungarian word is 'elofizetes' or 'berlet' and not 'abonament,' 'bizonyitvany' and not 'adeverinca,' 'hirdetmeny' and not 'afis,' 'eloleg' and not 'avansz,' 'figyelmeztetes' and not 'avertiszmment,' 'jegy' and not 'bilet,' 'volgyzarogat' and not 'barazs,' 'osztondij' and not 'bursza,' 'jelemzes' and not 'karakterizalas,' 'megye' and not 'zsudec,' 'titkar' and not 'szekretar,' 'elnok' and not 'presedinte,' 'gyules' or 'ules' and not 'sedinca.'" (Bela Kelemen) [The pairs of words are made up of one purely Hungarian word and a Hungarianized Romanian word.]

One study ("The Mother Tongue in the Home") deals with the powerful role of the home: "The family must make one aware of a communal linguistic experience, the social experience of belonging to one language and one culture." And later: "The general practice is that her job or profession await the mother after maternity leave is over and care of the child is then divided with the nursery or other institution established for this purpose...." Finally: "It is not a matter of indifference how the father or mother express themselves when speaking about their jobs, for example. 'I have been working in csirkulacio for 10 years but I have never had such a kursza,' a driver father might say. Or, 'There was a kontrol in the afternoon sihta and they didn't want to take the pemzlis.'" (Eva Cs. Gyimesi) [Hungarian words translated; Romanian words left in their Hungarianized form.]

3.

Cultivators of the Hungarian language, writers, journalists, Hungarian teachers and linguists in Romania deal with problems which are radically different from our language problems in Hungary.

What are they and, especially, what are they like?

"There is greater need than ever before for swift thinking in the mother tongue without transposal.... Instruction in the mother tongue thus becomes a foundation for thinking in a second, third, etc. language..." (Pal Teiszler)

"Many of the Hungarians in Romania use the Romanian language for everyday communication on the job and elsewhere. Thus the sphere for the mother tongue is the family, the school and perhaps one's friends." For this reason: "The cultivation of the mother tongue in our nationality life is perhaps receiving ever greater emphasis." And then: "Although its sphere of use is more limited in the life of a nationality the mother tongue not only facilitates family communication or reading, attendance at theaters and social gatherings but also is the foundation for acquiring political and professional information and self-awareness." (Gyorgy Beke) To quote the Romanian Hungarian journalist and writer Lucian Blaga: "Language is the first great poem of every people." Or to quote Kosztolanyi: "In it is my past, my present and my future. In it is my life. And in it is my death too. In it is my fate."

What fate? What sort of fate?

It might be of interest even for international linguistic science, the question raised by the study titled "Mother Tongue, Foreign Tongue": "When one begins to study a foreign language the student faces two fundamental logical experiences, the experience of similarity to the mother tongue and the experience of a deviation from it. Does the mother tongue help or hinder the mastering of the foreign tongue? Can we support ourselves on a knowledge of the mother tongue or should this be separated from language teaching? These are questions raised by language teachers." (Elek Ban) He is a believer in so-called contrastive linguistics. The mother tongue need not be disconnected but rather one should teach by contrasting the two languages.

It is easy for a Hungarian child in Hungary who must learn only the mother tongue and who need not face in his childhood the "two fundamental" but quite different "logical experiences." These two different logical experiences demand and require even from children hard and mature work, sensitivity, logical preparedness, consistency, intellectual presence and certainly no little effort.

4.

Let us fish out only two examples from this great sea of differences.

One refers to the "difference of view" and the other to the difference in the entire structure of language. One is a little study appearing in this volume (by Kalman Nagy) and the other appears in the 13 May 1977 issue of A HET, Bucharest (by N. Sandor Szilagyi).

The Hungarians in Romania are the best students of the problems of bilingualism because they experience it most directly--as are the Romanians who speak Hungarian. Szilagyi, for example, is on friendly terms with his Romanian friends, they do not argue, concerning the Hungarian verb "to go" [megy] because they are both vitally concerned with it. We can form new words by adding various prefixes, words meaning to go there, after, back, home, further, or in or to be destroyed, misled or correct, to go out, to him, through, away, beyond, around or to separate. What happens if we translate these words into Romanian? Let us look at a few examples: "megy" is "merge," "visszamegy" is "se intoarce," "bemeget" is "intra," "felmeget" is "coboara," "eloremeget" is "avanseaza," "kimeget" is "iese," "elmeget" is "pleaca," "felmeget" is "urca," "keresztulmeget" is "trace" and "atmeget" is "traverseaza."

The logical experience, the difference of which we spoke, is extremely great; there is a world of difference.

The example of Kalman Nagy, who translated the "Kalevala," bears witness to the great internal distances of the difference between the two languages.

"That which is a 'vital' danger [életveszely] in Hungarian is a 'mortal' danger in French and Romanian (danger de mort, pericol de moarte). In such a case one cannot debate as to which is correct. The two modes of expression reflect two different views. The meaning of vital danger is that one's life is in danger; the meaning of 'danger de mort' is that the danger could bring death."

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ALBANIA

HOXHA WORKS CITED IN ATTACK ON ABUSES IN PETROLEUM FIELD

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 25 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Mine Guri, first secretary of Berat District Party Committee:
"The Assimilation of the Science of Discovering Deposits Opens Wide
Prospects for the Petroleum Workers"]

[Text] In the framework of the formation and strengthening the raw material base for the people's economy, the discovery and exploitation of the great riches of the subsoil, especially the petroleum fields, are closely linked with the whole development of the country and the strengthening of its independence and defense. The 24th volume of Comrade Enver's works gives an important place also to this question. The teachings in this volume have great present and prospective value. They are a powerful weapon in the hands of the party organizations and committees and of the state organs and the economy of those regions in which petroleum and gas are searched for and extracted--for putting into effect the decisions of the Seventh Party Congress. "The orientation given on petroleum," writes Comrade Enver, "is correct, and...our petroleum workers and cadres will work persistently to put that orientation into effect. We are optimistic about finding new oil fields. But we must also bear in mind the other orientation about not moving away from the existing fields." (p 48)

The oil workers, under the guidance of the party organizations and committees, have rigorously adhered to this correct party orientation and have reaped successes. It has been and is the correct line of the party to adopt the measures which have made the petroleum industry one of the most important sectors of our economy. Persistent, rigorous and carefully controlled work, such as advised by Comrade Enver, caused the petroleum workers to enter courageously into oil problems and carry out the decisions of the Fourth Party Congress. They were years of hard struggle. Our party, loyally and heroically defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, also encountered a number of instances of systematic sabotage by the revisionist Soviet specialists, who tried to shut off the prospects for our people and economy. "All the revisionists," writes Comrade Enver, "had capitalist aims in the aid which they gave us, but

we did not permit this." (p 454) They demanded that we extract the raw material, iron-nickel, and that they should process it themselves, that is, that we Albanians should break our backs at work while the revisionists secured the profit. "This they called 'internationalist aid' ... For petroleum, too, they refused to give us machinery, so that we could not process the whole amount of it in our country, but were to give the crude to them to process. We understood these aims in time," writes Comrade Enver, "and gave them the deserved answer." (pp 454-455)

The tasks in the petroleum sector, as in every other sector of life, have been difficult. The people, under the party's leadership, had been mobilized to put into effect the directives of the Fourth Party Congress, which were to be a heavy blow to the internal and external enemies and a victory for us. In speaking about this before the petroleum engineers and technicians in Qyteti-Stalin, Comrade Enver emphasized that striking a limestone stratum opened great prospects for the development of petroleum and that "this road was opened up thanks to your work and the geological team, which in its exploratory work did not proceed according to the data and conclusions at which the Soviet specialists had arrived." (p 452) Therefore, says Comrade Enver in the same speech, "...you must strive to delve ever deeper into and assimilate more and more the science of discovering petroleum deposits. The further continuation of studies and self-improvement, must under no circumstances, be neglected. This will give you broad prospects and provide you with new weapons." (p 452)

The discovery of petroleum in our limestones, the expansion of the existing fields, and the erection of new oil and gas refineries in this country have fully confirmed the correctness of the party line and eliminated the sabotaging work of the Soviet and other revisionists, making our petroleum industry a branch of great importance and a base for the progress of the whole economy of the country. Today, when we see how the ex-socialist countries of Europe, and so forth, have ended up as colonies of the Soviet motherland and see our economy developed on the basis of the principle of self-reliance--which is advancing frontally to resist and break the fierce imperialist-revisionist blockade and the pressure of the present economic and financial crisis of capitalism--we understand more thoroughly how farsighted our party has been and is. In the petroleum sector, as in every other field, the working class, specialists and cadres--under the leadership of the party--have evaluated the situation politically and ideologically, mobilized all their strength and mental and physical energies, successfully fulfilled the tasks set by the party, discovered important oil and gas deposits, delivered a powerful blow to the fierce imperialist-revisionist blockade and have, at the same time, unmasked the sabotaging activity of the Soviet revisionist specialists. Our young cadres and specialists, employing the thinking of the workers, have not only determined and carried out the uncompleted studies left pending by the Soviet geologists but have, at the same time, refuted their sabotaging opinions that, in Albania, "the limestones are not petroleum-bearing," that the oil is "of poor quality" and so forth.

The orientations of the party and its Central Committee as well as Comrade Enver's teachings emerging from this volume have served as a basis on which to rest all the work of the party organizations and the state economic organs for success and new prospects. It is a known fact that the execution of every task and party directive also encounters various obstacles, which are discovered and overcome by always conducting the class struggle correctly. This is also shown by the experience of these recent years. The external and internal enemies have always attempted to obstruct and sabotage the rapid development of the petroleum industry by every means and in every way, using refined methods. They have tried to orient and direct the exploration for oil and gas into wrong, uneconomical and unscientific paths. By drilling at random and without producing results, they have sabotaged the discovery of new deposits. To cover up the traces of their sabotaging activity in the extraction of petroleum, they have stimulated barbarous methods of exploiting the existing deposits, with the aim of leaving the fatherland and the people without petroleum. But, as heretofore, the plans of the enemies--Abdyl Kellezi, Koco Theodhosi and others--have failed ignominiously.

Thorough acquaintance with the teachings emerging from a study of Volume 24 of Comrade Enver's works is a very effective weapon to aid the party organizations and the workers to put into effect the directives of the Seventh Party Congress, root out every trace of enemy activity also in the field of technicoscientific methods of exploration, oil and gas extraction, and so forth. The petroleum workers are now striving more resolutely to implant more correct concepts about geological studies and generalizations and to attain the main objective, namely the discovery of new oil and gas deposits. But the attainment of this objective, which forms the fundamental task of the petroleum workers, especially those in the field of geology, demands that the party and mass organizations wage a persistent fight and raise all ideo-political, organizational and technicoscientific work to a still higher level.

The party base organizations in the petroleum sector have as the principal directions of their work the enhancement of the leading role, the involvement of the thinking of the broad masses of petroleum workers in the problems of geology, the preparation of the structures on the basis of integrated studies, the establishment of correct proportions in exploration of petroleum strata in sand and limestone regions, proceeding from the known to the unknown, and so on. The chief attention has been concentrated on deepening the line of the masses; the drilling brigade is now an active mass, which engages in lively discussion and action not only concerning the technology and organization of drilling operations but also about problems of geology as a whole. As Comrade Enver teaches us, the deeper the discussion in the brigade and the fuller the cooperation of the workers and specialists of the brigade with the geological and technical service in all links, the higher will be the degree of responsibility and of the action itself in achieving positive geological results.

A comparison of the work and the achievements thus far with the teachings emerging from the materials in this volume brings out sharply the task of the party base organizations in deepening the struggle to implant more correct concepts as to the "massivization" of studies and generalizations regarding the raising of the quality of preparation of the structures, the testing and courageous use of new methods of interpretation both in geophysics on the site, in seismics and in every sector, as well as regarding the intensification of work to carry out the tasks to the end.

Decisive factors--in performing the tasks in geological exploration and the whole petroleum sector and in discovering the planned reserves of oil and gas in time--are the rapid drilling and efficient exploitation of the wells. Therefore, the work of the party base organizations has consisted in strengthening the conviction that the purpose of drilling is not a matter of meters, but of positive geologic results. With intense persuasive effort there have been improvements in drilling technology, which have led to an increase in the speed and quality of drilling. Special importance has been attached both in geological and in technological projecting to the involvement of the workers' thinking and the dissemination and generalization of advanced experience. This has produced solutions to a good many problems, such as the use of lightened washing liquids of high quality, the oriented drilling of wells, the resolution of a good many geological complications and so forth. Improvements have also been made in the assimilation process, but in spite of all struggle and effort, entirely correct concepts have still not been implanted in the whole mass of workers and specialists to the effect that this process, involving special responsibility, does not tolerate a wait-and-see policy and bureaucratic delays but demands strict proletarian and technical discipline. The process of assimilation demands, among other things, an increase in responsibility and the self-action of the geological and technical services in all their links. Shortcomings and weaknesses are noted sometimes right at the time of projecting the operations for assimilation [apparently "adaptation of the wells for production"]. Thus, under the influence of the concept that "assimilation will be lengthy," they project unsubstantiated time limits, which, in some cases, are not properly combated even right in the drilling brigade. Delays in assimilation are also due to various organizational deficiencies, and the analyses made of these problems have clearly brought out the need to understand thoroughly that assimilation is not only a period of "quiet," but is a process in which the data of the data and geological projections are verified in practice; it is a process upon which depends the materialization of all the struggle and efforts to discover new deposits and exploit the existing ones on a scientific basis. So Comrade Enver writes that we must use "all the advanced methods...in exploring for and exploiting petroleum, and, therefore, greater efforts must be made to learn." (p 451)

Strengthening proletarian and technicoscientific discipline in drilling oil and gas wells will be another direction in which a struggle will be

waged by the whole mass of communists and workers to do away with the mistaken and very harmful notion that "there is no drilling without breakdowns," at a time when advanced experience is not lacking and a majority of the drilling brigades have no breakdowns. The work of the party organizations must concentrate on an uncompromising fight against every manifestation of liberalism and irresponsible stands in this respect, and it must be insisted that the whole mass of petroleum workers understand thoroughly that without establishing responsible proletarian iron-labor discipline and without iron-hard technicoscientific discipline they cannot achieve successful and breakdown-free drilling of oil and gas wells and scientific treatment of the deposits. "While working," Comrade Enver bids the oil workers, "you must go ever deeper into and assimilate more and more of the science of discovering oil deposits." The petroleum workers even now, during the work for the execution of the tasks set by the Seventh Party Congress, are bearing well in mind this advice of our beloved leader. They are marching forward with courage and faith in their own strength to put into effect the fundamental task of the petroleum industry: the discovery of new oil and gas fields and the exploitation of the deposits on a scientific basis. The petroleum workers are constantly aware at all times of the party's special concern about this sector, which is so vital for the economy and a powerful weapon for frustrating and breaching the imperialist-revisionist encirclement and blockade against our country, and they are, therefore, overcoming the difficulties with revolutionary courage, passing on from one success to another and resolved to make a reality of the tasks of the Seventh Party Congress at all cost.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DR TOMASEK MADE CARDINAL

Pope's Announcement Quoted By Catholic Weekly

Prague KATOLICKE NOVINY in Czech No 24, 12 Jun 77 p 1

[Text] On 1 June 1977, the Holy Father Paul VI announced in Rome that he appointed the apostolic administrator of Prague, Bishop Frantisek Tomasek, to the office of cardinal.

The new cardinal, Monsignor Frantisek Tomasek, ThD, the titular bishop of Buta, apostolic administrator of the Prague archdiocese, was born on 30 June 1899 in Studenka, near Novy Jicin in Moravia. He was ordained to the priesthood by the Archbishop Antonin Cyril Stojan, ThD, in Olomouc on 5 July 1922. He lectured catechetics and pedagogy at the Cyril-Methodius Theological Faculty in Olomouc and, after it was closed during the Protectorate era from 1940 to 1945, at the theological institute in Olomouc. After Czechoslovakia's liberation in 1945 he returned to the Cyril-Methodius Theological Faculty in Olomouc, where he taught the same theological disciplines as an extraordinary professor from 1947 to 1950. He was consecrated as bishop on 14 October 1949 in Olomouc. He has been the administrator of the vacated archiepiscopal see of Prague from 11 March 1965 to the present.

Text of Letters Exchanged Between Husak, Tomasek

Prague LIDOVA DEMOCRACIE in Czech 15 Jul 77 p 1

[Text] For a Positive Development in the Church and State Relations--Letter by Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek and Reply by the President of the Republic G. Husak

On the occasion of his appointment to the office of cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, Bishop Frantisek Tomasek, ThD, the apostolic administrator of Prague, sent to the president of the republic, G. Husak, a letter with the following contents:

Dear Mr President:

I am taking the liberty of informing you that yesterday my appointment to the office of cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church has been announced.

As a bishop as well as a citizen of this country I consider it my important and pleasant duty to inform you, Mr President, about it.

As a bishop, administering the diocese of Prague, I am aware of all the preceding negotiations conducted by our country with the Holy See for the purpose of establishing good mutual relations. I may assure you that on my part and in my mission I am always ready to support eagerly these developing negotiations and to promote them in their further stages.

As a citizen of our community I highly appreciate and respect all the positive values which have enabled us to live in satisfaction of our material needs, social security and in peaceful and quiet life. When it concerns these social values which continue to grow stronger and firmer under your leadership, our believing people cannot remain inactive on the sidelines. They have always lent their hands to our common good work and increased and protected by their honest daily work all that is needed. I also wish to assure you, Mr President, of my sincere good will and endeavor. Our earthly home is not and never can be remote to us.

I wish you the best of health in your vital, historically responsible work as the first citizen and leading representative of our socialist republic. I wish for you that your name will always be uttered with respect and linked with the concept of goodness, justice and peace, which you are defending with conviction and vigor on the international scene.

Respectfully yours,
Bishop Tomasek

The President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Gustav Husak replied to Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek in the following letter:

Dear Mr Cardinal:

I thank you for your letter of 3 June, past, by which you inform me that by decision of Pope Paul VI you have been appointed to the office of cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. I am replying belatedly because I was informed that you stayed in Rome for some time.

In sincerely contratulating you on such a high church office, I appreciate your assurance that, as a citizen of our country and as a high, responsible representative of your church, you appreciate all the positive values created by our socialist state for man's benefit.

I am happy to learn of your affirmation and sincere good will to contribute to our state's prosperity, to our people's happiness and also to the positive development of relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Czechoslovak State.

I am interested in a positive course of the negotiations conducted by our state with the Holy See and in an arrangement of mutually beneficial relations.

I am happy to learn of your intention to influence such negotiations in a positive way.

I thank you for your good wishes and kind words addressed to me. Please permit me to wish you the best of health, success in your work for our people's benefit, personal happiness and satisfaction.

Respectfully yours,

Gustav Husak.

9004

CSO: 2400

EAST GERMANY

EFFECTS OF CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER ON CLASS STRUGGLE ANALYZED

East Berlin DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK in German Vol 22 No 7, Jul 77 signed to press 27 May 77 pp 25-42

[Article by Alexander Martin, Institute for International Politics and Economics, East Berlin: "Effects and Dynamics of the International Balance of Power Between Socialism and Imperialism"]

[Text] The essence, substance and structure of the international balance of power in the current epoch as well as the direction in which it changes are governed by the basic objective laws in the international class conflict. Those interconnections have been treated in our analysis entitled "Criteria of the International Balance of Power."¹

There is however still another side to the problems of the international balance of power. With the changes in the international balance of power, the conditions under which the laws of the international class struggle work, being modified by them, also change. The conditions in the worldwide struggle between the opposing forces are changing, as do their strategic positions, their possibilities and the forms and methods of their conflict. The international balance of power is the most significant among all the conditions of struggle. V. I. Lenin has presented as an inevitability this dependence of the forms of class struggle on the conditions under which the struggle is carried on.²

Main Features of the International Balance of Power at Present

Today's international balance of power is the ratio between the effective potentials of socialism, the workers class in the capitalist countries and the peoples fighting against colonialism, and neocolonialism, and for national independence, on the one side, and imperialism, on the other. Its main component is the balance of power between socialism and imperialism. SED Central Committee General Secretary Erich Honecker stated at the Ninth SED Congress: "With all the great variety of international relations among states in the world today, the conflict between the two social systems is the central axis of international development."³

The distribution of stress placed on this axis, the balance of power between socialism and imperialism, in other words, therefore amounts to the key problem in world politics. All fundamental questions of international development crucially depend on it: Will the peace-loving forces manage to maintain world peace or will expansionist imperialism throw mankind into a nuclear catastrophe? Can the principles of peaceful coexistence be enforced all around and become the everyday standard procedure in the relations between states with differing social orders? What are the prospects for a democratic transformation of the relations in the world economy desired by the socialist states and the developing countries? Will the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America be able to gain their economic independence in their struggle against imperialism?

The chief characteristic in today's international balance of power is that imperialism has forfeited its supremacy in the overall system of international relations and socialism more and more emphatically controls the nature of this system and its main developmental tendencies. At the Ninth SED Congress, the international balance of power was described as follows: "The strength of the socialist world system, its stability and dynamics, in close cooperation with the other chief revolutionary currents of our time, the international workers movement and the national liberation movement, more and more determines the course of events in the world. Although imperialism remains a dangerous opponent, the development confirms that it has lost forever its once dominating position in world affairs."⁴

The international positions of the community of socialist states were never as strong as they are today. Their economic, political and military power, their successes in constructing the new society, and their foreign policy aimed at consolidating world peace insure their constantly growing influence on world development. To the Soviet Union goes the lion's share in strengthening the potentials of the anti-imperialist forces all throughout the world. Thanks to the Soviet Union, another world war could be prevented and imperialism lost the historic initiative.

After the historic victory by the peoples of Indochina over the imperialist aggressors, reunited Vietnam is constructing socialism. The people of Laos is moving in the same direction. The diplomatic and economic blockade against the first socialist state in the western hemisphere has met with failure, and Cuba's international positions have been reinforced.

"The proclamation of people's republics in Mozambique and Angola has decisively changed the balance of power in southern Africa. In the sphere of imperialist supremacy and racism in Africa now for the first time states have arisen that are moving toward socialist revolution."⁵

More than 80 new states have emerged in Asia, Africa and Latin America as the result of the collapse of the colonial system. In world economics and world politics they are amounting to a force today which "in alliance with world socialism commands a gigantic anti-imperialist potential."⁶ In the countries that chose to follow the socialist orientation the positions of the revolutionary-democratic parties are becoming solid.

The upswing taken by the workers movement and the general democratic movements in many West European states has played a significant role in the change of the international balance of power. That is indicated not only by the elimination of the last fascist regimes in Europe -- in Greece, Portugal and Spain -- but also by the fact that the communists' participating in the government is becoming an ever more likely possibility in Italy and France.

The positions of imperialism, however, in the judgment of the international balance of power given by the Berlin Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties of Europe, have been weakened. It can neither "cancel the historic achievements of socialism nor halt the advance of the progressive forces, of the movement for the liberation and independence of the peoples."⁷ While it continues to hold an enormous and dangerous potential, it yet had to accommodate its policy to the new situation in the world.

One of the most important results of the change in the international balance of power is the turn in international relations from the cold war to the peaceful coexistence among states with differing social orders. The breach into this turn was opened only after the peoples had provided a fiasco for the attempts by imperialism in the '60's at regaining its historic initiative through large-scale counterattacks against the revolutionary forces. Detente became the main tendency in international relations.

The connection between the change in the international balance of power and the process of detente is clearly apparent in Europe, the continent where the positions of socialism are the strongest. Here detente has made the greatest progress. After the treaties of Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin and Prague with the FRG it became particularly evident in the successful conclusion of CSCE. The Final Act of Helsinki reflects the balance of power in Europe and in the world in that it, first of all, has made those principles into fundamental norms of conduct for interstate relations which the socialist states have stood for from the outset, secondly, contains not a single element of the abortive postwar doctrines of imperialism and, thirdly, was agreed on as a balance of interests and with attention to the views and positions of all participants. Postwar borders and postwar realities were written into international law, and the foundations were laid for cooperation with mutual advantage.

The effects brought about by the changed balance of power are so extensive that their mere summarization would go beyond the framework of this article. This article therefore will confine itself to three methodological problems: The completely new effect the balance of power exercises in our epoch, the role of the balance of power as part of all the main factors (main determinants) that determine the relations between socialist and imperialist states, and its effect on the aggressiveness of imperialism.

Fundamental Differences in the Effect of the Balance of Power

Many bourgeois theoreticians apply one and the same yardstick, the identical criteria, to the various types of balance of power -- be they between Athens

and Sparta, Rome and Carthage, the Entente and the Central Powers, or the two "superpowers" USSR and United States. They are formulating "eternal" inevitable laws which have presumably at all times determined the effects the balance of power has had on international relations. In principle, to them everything comes down to the notion that it always is the strength of "power" that determines its effect. The stronger a state (or a group of states), the more it can impose its will on other states, rule them and so forth.

The truth is, however, that such laws in effect "at all times" exist as little as do "eternal" criteria for different types of an international balance of power. What effects are produced by any given balance of power does not primarily -- let alone exclusively -- depend on the relative or absolute strength of opposing forces, that is to say, it does not primarily depend on whether a state (or a group of states) has preponderance over other states or a certain equilibrium exists among them. Rather, the effect is principally determined by the class nature of the opposing forces and hence, by the nature of the problems the conflict is all about.

Throughout the various epochs of class society the results of a change in the international balance of power are as diverse as are the types of class character of the states forming the system of international relations. Only on that foundation can one establish the role played by the relative and absolute strength of the states. This does not mean to deny, of course, that the effects of the international balance of power had many identical features in the various exploiter societies in as much as they -- regardless of what was specific to each -- always were power relations among states that were instruments in the hands of the exploiting classes. At present times, however, entirely novel effects are occurring because they result from a balance of power marked by the opposition between a society free from exploitation and the last form of exploitation in history, which already has become obsolete. And this is what bourgeois theory deliberately ignores.

Yet let us first describe the effects of the international balance of power in the period before 1917, when imperialism ruled the whole world. At that time the inevitable interconnections between world economy and world politics crystallized through monopoly domination, the highest stage of capitalist exploiter relations. From the monopolist profit greed, with the necessity of a natural law, as it were, there resulted the typically imperialist drive for expansion and the forceful suppression of other peoples, the uneven economic and political development in the imperialist states, and their rivalry in the incessant cycle of war - postwar - war preparation - war.

The basic issue in the conflict between the rivaling powers was to acquire the largest possible part of the world for one's own monopoly bourgeoisie as a sphere for exploitation and shoring it up against its competitors. The relations of the rule by the minority and the suppression of the majority existing within the imperialist states also shaped the system of their international relations: A handful of imperialist powers dominated the peoples of the earth.

These basic conditions at the time when imperialism held sway were always the same, regardless of what the balance of power between the rivaling imperialist powers was like. Whatever the balance of power was like, it always amounted to a secondary effect⁸ for the rules governing the prevailing system of international relations in imperialism.

It, first of all, acted as "regulator" for dividing the world into exploitation and influence spheres among those powers. The economic, financial, and military strength of those states decided the struggle over which of them would annex this or that colony and smaller states, which would become a dependency of others, which states would suppress other states.

Second, the uneven economic development of the imperialist states permanently caused a spontaneous and unregulated shift in the international balance of power, its never ending instability. The distribution of the world in terms of the old power ratio came into opposition with the changing balance of power. The ensuing struggle for the redistribution of spheres was bound to lead to an intensification of international tensions and produced crisis situations and military conflicts that proliferated into world wars. Peace in international relations prevailed only as long as an equilibrium among the states did not allow for new conquests. "But as soon," V. I. Lenin wrote, "as the balance of power had changed, how could then contradictions under capitalism be settled in any other way but through force?"⁹ And elsewhere he said: "There is no contradiction between war and the bases of private property, but war rather constitutes a direct and unavoidable development of those bases. Under capitalism, an equal growth in the economic development of the various national economies and states is impossible. Capitalism has no other means for restoring from time to time its upset equilibrium but crises in industry and wars in politics."¹⁰

Thirdly, when the balance of power changes between imperialist states, it also results in a change in the leadership positions in the system of domination and suppression. That is the only sense in which the structure of that system of international relations changes. The structure of domination and suppression itself, however, remains unaffected by the changes in the balance of power.

Entirely novel inevitable interrelations in world economics and world politics were generated in the epoch of the transition of the world from capitalism to socialism, initiated with the victory of the Great Socialist October Revolution. They created a new type of international balance of power producing effects fundamentally different from those of the balance of power in the epoch of imperialism.

First, the balance of power between socialist and imperialist states does not decide on which of them will exploit or oppress one part of the world or another. Because here we have the balance of power between one part of the world free from exploitation and foreign national suppression and the ruling class of that international exploiter system that continues to exist in the other part of the world. As G. Shakhnazarov demonstrates in an article

published in the Soviet journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, the struggle between socialism and imperialism also is not confined to the sphere of interstate relations: "It also includes the movement of the various social and political forces, through which the frontline crosses national frontiers and splits social strata, and the conflicts also enter the human soul."¹¹

Each new phase in the development of this balance of power signifies a new stage of the revolutionary world process, of the rise of socialism and the decline of capitalism. It changes the strategic positions of all revolutionary forces on the one side and of imperialism, on the other. The stronger socialism becomes, the better become the possibilities for a progressive development of the revolutionary world process, and the deeper becomes the general crisis of the capitalist system. At the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev described the fundamental importance of the international balance of power today as follows: "The development of the socialist countries, the growth of their power and the growing strength in the positive influence of their international politics -- therein lies the main direction of the social progress of mankind today."¹²

Second: Whereas the constant shifts of the international balance of power in the imperialist epoch led to an intensification of international tensions and to wars, the development of the balance of power between socialism and imperialism has had the very opposite consequences. The change in the international balance of power in favor of socialism is the most important reason why the cycle "war - postwar - war preparation - war" could be broken. It created the basis for detente in international relations. The stronger socialism is, the greater are the possibilities for preventing another world war and for developing the relations between socialist and capitalist states on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. At the GDR's celebration of its 32nd anniversary of liberation, Horst Sindermann said: "Europe is living through the longest peace period in this century because the power ratio between the social systems of socialism and capitalism has fundamentally changed in favor of socialism."¹³

Third: The change in the balance of power between socialism and imperialism leads to qualitative changes in the total system of international relations. This balance of power has reached such a stage of development today that "profit greed, competition and domination over others, the decisive inevitabilities for the relations within the capitalist system, could more and more be put back to a secondary position in the overall system of world politics. The inevitabilities in the struggle and relations between socialism and capitalism have become the decisive laws of motion in world politics."¹⁴ The stronger socialism and the greater its influence on world politics and world economics, the more the overall system of international relations changes toward a fundamental democratization, and the more the structures of domination and subordination become replaced by structures of collaboration on equal terms by sovereign states.

Principal Determinants in the Relations Between Socialist and Imperialist States

Greater possibilities for the development of the revolutionary world process, the safeguarding of peace and the democratic transformation of international relations -- these are the principal effects of the change of the international balance of power for the benefit of socialism. The point, thus, is not that the international balance of power is working like clockwork, as it were, the handles of which move only in one direction and could not be turned back. If that were the case, then the process of detente would have "run its course," so to speak, and the new balance of power would not only have improved the possibilities for preventing world war, it would have made such war impossible. But that evidently is not the way things are, as demonstrated by the increased activities in which the enemies of detente are engaged and by the intensified material preparations for war in the form of the imperialist armaments frenzy. The Berlin Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties of Europe has applauded the advances made in the field of relaxation. But it also has emphasized that "world peace is by no means guaranteed as yet, detente is not yet stable, and serious obstacles still have to be surmounted on the course toward permanent security and cooperation."¹⁵

It is necessary clearly to define the role of the international balance of power, that is to say, to discover the principal determinants which in their totality determine the relations between socialist and imperialist states. What are they? Let us first look at an attempt made by Richard Lowenthal, professor for international politics at West Berlin and Columbia -- an unsuitable attempt, as we will show -- at defining the right determinants: "The history of the East-West conflict that has split the world since the end of World War II knows of three great constants and one chief variable. The first constant is the rivalry between the two superpowers, the second, the opposition between the systems of these two powers, and the third, the need for 'peaceful coexistence' in the sense of preventing a suicidal nuclear war. The chief variable lies in the fluctuating readiness or ability by the adversaries in continuing their confining the forms and areas of conflict by means of genuine negotiations and partial agreements."¹⁶

That kind of analysis, distorting the actual interconnections, is typical of bourgeois political science. The introductory sentence patently aims not only at obscuring the class bases in the conflict between socialist and capitalist states -- for which reason the meaningless concept "East-West" conflict is introduced -- but also at postponing the start of the conflict, the "split of the world," from 1917 to 1945. How else would Lowenthal arrive at the thesis that the "first constant" is the "rivalry between the superpowers?" In this utilitarian construct, however, every word is either wrong or, at least, inexact.

First: The relation between the Soviet Union and the United States is not, and cannot be, the first constant. For if one wants to admit the concept "superpowers" in the first place, with all its imprecision, in the sense

that these two states are of the strongest weight indeed in the conflict between socialism and imperialism, then it follows that this conflict itself must be the first constant. The mutual relation between the two strongest states of the two world systems is derived from it, shaped by it.

Second: Within the scope of this conflict, however, the existence of two "superpowers" is not even a constant but the result of a variable -- the change in the international balance of power. It is the result of the rise by the once backward Russia into the socialist world power and of a shift in power within the imperialist camp which established U.S. supremacy, meanwhile shaken, in that part of the world.

Third: Lowenthal distorts the mutual relation between the Soviet Union and the United States into a rivalry relationship in the struggle for world domination. The truth is, however, that the antagonistic nature of the opposition between the two states finds its proper expression in the very fact that, in contrast to the United States, such an ambition is totally alien to the socialist Soviet Union, which has always fought against any kind of world domination designs. By all this talk about the "superpower of the Soviet Union" imperialist propaganda aims at discrediting the Soviet Union's peace policy, imputing expansionist aims to it and constructing contrasts between the Soviet Union and its allies.

From the totally erroneous nature of Lowenthal's "first constant" we get to his false second constant. It is not the "opposition between the systems of these two powers" that is working in the world; it rather is that these two powers are operating on the basis of the opposition between the social systems in which they are the two strongest members.

Regarding his "third constant," Lowenthal seems to indicate some realism. Preventing a nuclear worldwar is and remains the most important task of all nations, all states. And yet, can one agree with Lowenthal in his half-hearted endorsement of the need for peaceful coexistence -- indicated by his putting it in quotation marks -- exclusively for the need of avoiding nuclear war? Has he "forgotten" that the desire for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states determined the Soviet Union's foreign policy course already at a time when one did not even think as yet of nuclear weapons? And furthermore, is it not a fact that most imperialist powers stubbornly refused to accept peaceful coexistence with the socialist states right down to the beginning of this decade? What then has induced them to consider it? And finally: does peaceful coexistence not mean more than preventing war? Is it altogether conceivable even without peaceful cooperation?

Something else remains to be said about Lowenthal's "chief variable." If concepts make any sense at all, the "chief variable" would have to express the most important changes by it in the world, whereby all other changes are significantly conditioned. This, to him, is the fluctuation in the readiness and ability by the "adversaries" for negotiations and agreements on confining the conflict. But this is already objectively

incorrect because the "adversaries" are being put on one and the same level. The socialist states have never shown any lack of readiness. There, no "change" has taken place. But why has this readiness changed on the other side?

The only point in which one can go along with Lowenthal's view is that with respect to the chief determinants governing the relations between socialist and imperialist states, a distinction is to be made between "constants" and "variables." This "agreement," of course, pertains only to the formal aspect of it.

For the actual constants are the inevitabilities rooted in the unchanging nature of the antagonistic social systems, basic to the relations between socialist and imperialist states and being effective throughout the entire epoch of the transition of the world from capitalism to socialism. As variables, on the other hand, must be summarized all those complexes of factors that constantly do change throughout that entire epoch, whereby the changes in interstate relations and in the effects the constants exercise are caused.

The first constant is the antagonistic contradiction between the socialist and the capitalist social order and the, from it, inevitably resulting conflict between the two systems. Regardless of the form assumed by the relations between socialist and capitalist states, the contest here has always been and is an essential element of these relations. The contradiction here is fundamentally different in nature from contradictions among imperialist states. If they are placed in opposition with each other, that comes from their having identical goals -- the expansion of their sphere of exploitation at the cost of their competitors --, whereas in the relations between socialist and imperialist states, two in principle opposing tendencies are clashing over the type and character of the system of international relations, over the development of world politics and the world economy.

The second constant is the course taken by the socialist states toward peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states, and it follows from the inevitable connection between socialism and peace. In socialist society there is no class that could derive any advantages from enslaving and exploiting foreign nations or conquering foreign territories. Peace is a fundamental condition for the construction of the socialist and communist society and for realizing its goal of providing maximum satisfaction for men's growing material and cultural needs. The struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states and against imperialist aggression has been the guiding principle of socialist foreign policy ever since the October Revolution; it always has been and will remain a constant of world politics.

The third constant is the already referred to inevitable connection between monopoly rule and aggressiveness. The craving for expansion, for acquiring foreign territories, raw material sources, capital investment spheres, and the enslavement and exploitation of other nations has been and remains an essential feature of imperialism.

The first variable lies in the changing balance of power, increasingly for the benefit of socialism, the international workers class and the national liberation movement during this epoch. It lends concrete expression to the law of motion in our epoch, the transition from capitalism to socialism.

The second variable lies in the complex of processes of a global character sparked by the tempestuous development of the productive forces, especially (a) the ever more growing trend toward a worldwide division of labor; (b) the immense dangers threatening all mankind as caused by the changes in military technology and warfare; and (c) the dangers resulting for men's living conditions from the effects of the scientific-technical revolution.

Only within this framework can one understand the effect the balance of power between socialism and imperialism has on the relations among the states in the two systems. Whatever the concrete historic situation may be -- nothing can change the inevitable interconnections defined above as constants. A change in the international balance of power cannot do away, while it can significantly modify, these inevitabilities. That is to say, the antagonism between the two systems cannot be made to disappear or be mitigated, and conflict cannot be removed from interstate relations. The balance of power cannot change the aggressive nature of imperialism. And as the entire history of the Soviet Union and of the community of socialist states has shown, their peace course is not affected by it either.

With the changing international balance of power, the conditions and modes through which the inevitable interconnections become effective also change. The conflict between socialism and imperialism goes on, but its concrete content, dimensions and forms do change. The relationship of dialectical contradiction between the socialist peace course and imperialist aggressiveness assumes an ever changing mode under the conditions of a balance of power constantly developing.

Not being able to eliminate these two conflicting tendencies, no given balance of power can automatically or unequivocally predetermine the course of international development. Ultimately it does "decide" which of these tendencies is more likely to prevail and become the main trend in international relations, with the other trend still continuing, if under restraints.

The increase in the power of socialism and its growing influence on international events have turned detente into the main trend in international relations. But, as SED Central Committee General Secretary Erich Honecker has emphasized, "there is an opposing trend to the decisive one of detente. It is shown by the activities of those circles that would love to throw Europe back into the condition of cold war."¹⁷

From the counter-trend results uneven development in the main trend, a fluctuation between accelerating the detente process and slowing it down. It makes possible sudden shifts in world politics.

The Effect of the New Balance of Power on the Aggressiveness of Imperialism

A change in the balance of power between socialism and imperialism means that the objective conditions under which imperialism exists, the economic and political situation at large, changes. Restricting the imperialist sphere of domination is not confined to a partial loss of territory on the part of imperialism that was formerly at its disposal and today is part of the territory of the socialist world system. Reduced also have been the possibilities for the imperialist powers in enforcing their economic and political aims by their characteristic methods within the overall system of international relations against the socialist states, against the states that have freed themselves from the colonial yoke, and even in the competition struggle with each other. An unbridgeable contradiction exists between the new balance of power and the old fighting methods of imperialism.

Thus, imperialism has definitively and completely lost its monopoly in international relations. The new international balance of power restricts the monopoly bourgeoisie's international action capability, its foreign policy leeway. This principally concerns the essential restraint for its possibilities of indulging freely its inherent craving for expansion. The stronger socialism is, the higher is the dam that contains the drive for aggression.

The balance of power between socialism and imperialism has developed in such a way that a new strategic situation in the world has been brought about in that, first, any military attack upon the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries would mean suicide for the imperialist states and, second, even in a "local" war the imperialist aggressors no longer have a guarantee that they could defeat a relatively small country.

In the early '60's, leading U.S. political scientists still had emphatically held the opinion that preserving and consolidating the political system of imperialism was "the important priority task for future strategy, more important than the preservation of peace. We cannot allow the political system opposed to ours to remain alive."¹⁸

When one draws the balance sheet today in the imperialist states from the wars of aggression against socialist states (Korea, Vietnam, Cuba) and against the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the fiasco of the imperialist postwar strategy becomes all too apparent, however.

Of special importance is the fact that the barriers to imperialist possibilities for expansion grew higher precisely at a time when the crisis developments within the capitalist system, embracing all of social life, intensified extremely. To get out of its contradictions, imperialism, as long as it still enjoyed supremacy, would normally unleash wars. But today's international balance of power no longer allows the imperialist states to resort to the traditional forms for "cleaning up" conflict situations without jeopardizing the very existence of the entire imperialist system of government.

This means that the nature of imperialism and the inevitabilities inhering in it are no longer the only chief determinants in the imperialist states' foreign policy, that this policy can no longer be explained out of the socio-economic foundations of imperialism and the balance of power within the imperialist system, but now shows some features that are alien to it and have been imposed upon it by the main currents of the revolutionary world process. This raises to new significance Lenin's remark: "Forgetting the characteristic nature of political and strategic interrelations and reiterating at any suitable, or unsuitable, opportunity the one memorized little word 'imperialism' in no way amounts to Marxism."¹⁹

New possibilities, for example, have arisen for providing a new foundation for the economic relations between the developing countries and the imperialist states. The United States and other imperialist powers can no longer impose their will on the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America by military force. Despite its immeasurable technical military superiority, despite a potential in nuclear weapons that would be enough for destroying the entire population of the world many times over, the United States was unable to gain victory in any of the local wars it has unleashed against those nations (excepting its intervention against the Dominican Republic). Great Britain and France have had to forget about enforcing their imperialist interests by war for more than 20 years by now. This has produced new fighting conditions for the anti-imperialist, national liberation movement. The current international balance of power -- as was stated at the Ninth SED Congress -- has brought about real possibilities "for overcoming the international division of labor that imperialism has produced and that serves the neocolonial exploitation and for creating international economic relations on equal terms."²⁰

Bourgeois political science now seeks to hide, as it has before, the causes and nature of the changes in the international balance of power. It can no longer make a secret of the fact, however, that penetrating changes have occurred in the structure of international relations which are more and more confining the possibilities for imperialist power politics. The relentless logic of realities in the world today forces the author of the introductory theoretical article in a compendium published in the summer of 1976 in the FRG, dealing with the military strategy of the main NATO powers, to admit that the "real costs of the use of force have risen." This remarkable state of affairs, even if by no means completely defined by the above statement, is then supported by the following revealing data: "In 1830, the French needed only 30,000 men to conquer Algeria. In 1962, twenty times that many troops could not hold Algeria. The Americans had the same experience in Vietnam. Although Vietnam was totally ploughed up by a bomb load four times as large as that of World War II, the United States was unable to attain its goal of maintaining a certain political system in South Vietnam."²¹

In the same sense, for example, three prominent American scientists expressed themselves in a study on the relation between world economics and world politics today. In a number of cases, so they state, "as in the U.S. support of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in 1961 or the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, the policy of force has led to catastrophic results. In other conflicts, where

one would have resorted to force in the past, as in the Arab oil embargo against the United States in 1973-1974, the United States used other means of influence. The 'gunboat policy' is largely being regarded as too dangerous, as a means that often produces the very opposite results from what was expected; force is being considered an undesirable means of intervention, except in the case of last resort."²²

These utterances are interesting in two different respects. For one thing, there is an allusion to the forms in which the change in the balance of power affects the policy of the imperialist states. As is well known, imperialist politicians have always had the greatest difficulties in properly assessing the international balance of power. Nothing but the relentless solidity of reality can force them to revise their policy. Once the United States found itself compelled to abandon its policy of open military aggression and cold war, which blind anticommunism had led it into, and to accept peaceful co-existence, this was not merely done because that policy was unsuccessful. The main factor was that the ruling class had to come to the conviction that the international balance of power was such that its previous maxim of using any means as long as they did damage only to socialism and all other revolutionary forces did great damage to its own class interests and jeopardized its own system of government.

Secondly, the text indicates that forceful intervention alone has become "undesirable" but not intervention as such (it being kept in readiness as last resort). "Other means of influence," other methods of intervention are gaining priority for reaching the aggressive goals.

The growth of the political, economic and military power of socialism confronted the imperialist powers with the necessity to subject their foreign policy strategy to a fundamental revision, seek new forms of foreign policy activity and apply corrections to their ideas about the development of international relations. They had to recognize that no reasonable alternative exists to peaceful coexistence. A dialectical relation exists between the aggressive nature and the new manifestations of imperialist policy, the crucial magnitude of which lies in the international balance of power. After imperialism had been forced, from the now untenable cold war positions, back onto the new fighting level of the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social orders, it is now seeking, by the means left to it as well as the possibilities the detente process may offer, to get out of the defensive. The main tendency in imperialist policy now became "that trend which would like to contain the advance of socialism through an extensive anticommunist counterattack and put pressure on the socialist states without risking by it the continuation of the detente process."²³

What hits the eye in the current policy of the imperialist states is how deeply contradictory it is, which is reflected in all the spheres of their international relations. Their attitude toward the detente process is governed by three profound contradictions:

First, by the contradiction between their undiminished expansionist and aggressive drive and their diminished and restrained possibilities for using their typical means and methods for realizing that drive; second, by the contradiction between their undiminished deadly enmity against socialism and the compulsion under which they are to work together with the socialist states which, in combination with the changed international balance of power, results from the factors summarized above as the second chief variable -- the necessity to avoid a nuclear world war, use the advantages of a global international division of labor for the benefit of the capitalist reproduction process, and meet the worldwide dangers threatening the human environment; and third, by the contradiction between the ever stronger opposition within their own reciprocal relations and the need, in view of the offensive by all revolutionary forces, for a united and coordinated strategy against the socialist states.

On the one hand, the leading NATO states espouse a policy of detente and peaceful coexistence with the socialist states. On the other hand, they are intensifying the arms race and thereby prevent supplementing the political detente by the military detente, which is indispensable to stabilizing peace. On the one side, they are endorsing the Final Act of Helsinki, but on the other side they are abusing parts of the Final Act for purposes that contradict its main concern -- the strengthening of international security -- and violate a whole number of basic principles (safety of borders, nonintervention in internal affairs). On the one hand they are continuing their cooperation with the socialist states, especially in the economic and scientific-technical fields; on the other hand they are increasing their ideological diversion directed against the socialist order.

The chief danger that confronts the detente process, which grows out of the aggressive nature of imperialism, lies in that the military detente is lagging behind the political detente and that in this domain extremely strong cold war structures and elements still exist. At its London conference in May 1977, the NATO Council has focused on further intensifying the arms race.

What the general theory on objective systems has found to be the case with regard to reversals applies without reservation to the system of international relations: "The possibility of reversals remains very great as long as the qualitative transformation has not yet been completely achieved, as long as the new qualitative condition is not yet fully stabilized and structures and elements of the previous qualitative condition are not yet completely eliminated, that is, either destroyed or transformed, integrated into the new condition."²⁴

The concentration of extremely strong armed forces on the European continent, with their most dangerous destructive capacities, the intensification of the arms race, the accumulation of ever larger supplies in weapons, weapons of mass annihilation among them, the continued maintenance of foreign military bases and foreign armed forces on the territory of other states, the imperialist pressure and the intervention in internal affairs -- these are

"structures and elements of the previous qualitative condition," of the cold war, which the communist and workers parties of Europe have called "a direct source of danger for peace, security and the cooperation among the states."²⁵

Yet as before, there is in effect, and growing stronger, the totality of those factors that turned detente into the most important and predominant trend in the development of international relations. As the most important change in world politics, W. W. Sagladin defined the fact that "today, for the first time in human history, it is not any longer the logic of imperialism, not any longer its evil intent, that is decisive in international affairs."²⁶

Therein lies the main effect of the new international balance of power. Thereby the external conditions for the construction and development of the new society in the countries of the socialist community have significantly improved and more favorable international fighting conditions have arisen for all revolutionary movements. The change in the international balance of power in favor of socialism benefits all people who advocate peace, democracy and social progress.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. A. Martin, DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, Berlin, 1975, No 11, pp 1688 ff.
2. Cf. V. I. Lenin, "Werke" (Works), Vol 11, Berlin, 1966, pp 202 f.
3. "Bericht des ZK der SED an den IX. Parteitag der SED" (SED Central Committee Report to the Ninth SED Congress), Berlin, 1976, p 21.
4. Ibid., p 9.
5. From the status report of the Central Committee of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) submitted by Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO and the People's Republic of Mozambique, cf. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 5/6 February 1977.
6. B. Ponomaryov, "The Role of Socialism in Contemporary Worldwide Development," PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, Berlin, 1975, No 1, p 5.
7. Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties of Europe, Berlin, 29-30 June 1976, "Dokumente und Reden" (Documents and Speeches), Berlin, 1976, p 22.
8. Marxist-Leninist philosophy differentiates between the specific effects of objective laws. On the specific effects of the first rank depends whether the law in question works at all. They constitute the general, necessary and essential relations contained in that particular law. Specific effects of the second rank, above and beyond the general, necessary and essential interconnections of the law, cause a certain relation among the possibilities for how the law comes into effect. Therein precisely lies the role of the international balance of power.

9. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 22, Berlin, 1971, p 278.
10. Ibid., Vol 21, Berlin, 1970, pp 344 f.
11. G. Shakhnarazov, "Factors With Impact on International Relations," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, Moscow, 1977, No 1, p 94.
12. "25th CPSU Congress, CPSU Central Committee Status Report and the Next Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy," Berlin, 1976, p 35.
13. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 9 May 1977.
14. "Allgemeine Krise des Kapitalismus. Triebkrafte und Erscheinungsformen in der Gegenwart." (General Crisis of Capitalism--Impulses and Manifestations at Present), Berlin, 1976, p 64.
15. Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties of Europe," loc. cit., p 22.
16. R. Lowenthal, "Does Detente Have a Future? About Real and Apparent Changes in World Politics," DIE ZEIT, Hamburg, 2 April 1976.
17. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 16/17 October 1976.
18. R. Strausz-Hupe, W. Kintner and St. Possony, "A Forward Strategy for America," New York, 1961, p 402.
19. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 23, Berlin, 1970, p 43.
20. "Bericht des ZK der SED . . .," loc. cit., pp 20 f.
21. J. Jeffe, "Power and Powers in International Politics--On the Structural Change of the International System," "Sicherheitspolitik. Analysen zur politischen und militaerischen Sicherheit" (Security Policy--Analyses on Political and Military Security), Bad Honeff-Erpel, 1976, p 24.
22. C. F. Bergsten, O. Kechane and J. S. Nye, "International Economics and International Politics: A Framework for Analysis," "World Politics and International Economics," Washington, 1975, p 8.
23. M. Schmidt, "Results and Tasks of the Marxist-Leninist Imperialism Research," IPW-BERICHTe, Berlin, 1976, No 4, p 10.
24. G. Pawelzig, "Dialektik der Entwicklung objektiver Systeme" (Dialectics in the Development of Objective Systems), Berlin, 1970, p 91.
25. Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties . . .," loc. cit., p 22.
26. W. W. Sagladin, "The Changes in the World and the Communist World Movement," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 23 December 1975.

AIR RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION REPORTED

Budapest POLGARI VEDELEM in Hungarian No 7, Jul 77 p 7

[Article: "Expediently, Economically"]

[Text] When there is talk of shelter construction, everyone thinks in terms of millions of forints. But the construction expense of shelters to protect against fallout primarily requires a significantly smaller amount, which can be further decreased if one does not mind the time and effort which must be spent to take into consideration the possibilities.


Plans are to create establishments to protect against fallout in the areas of the cities and jarases [zones] in Pest Megye. Vac Jares has also prepared a specific plan about this. And they have begun to investigate, with respect to the plan, how good establishments could be created economically.

The house factory of the No 43 Construction Industry National Enterprise operates in Dunakeszi. The house factory collective proved to be a good partner in carrying out the ideas of the jaras group. Thus the opportunity opened up for the purchase of such an off-specification panel which is inexpensive but serves the purpose well. And the Canube Valley Construction Industry KTSZ [Artisan Cooperative] not only provided the area for the construction of the shelter, but Bela Mayering, the chief of technological rescue, also provided experts to direct [the project], who guaranteed the technical correctness of the construction.

Plans of the establishment with a 21 x 12-meters area were also prepared by the cooperative's technological collective. The establishment will cost about 100,000 forints by the time it is completely finished. And after it is completed, it will be in service to solve the city commandery's storage problem, thus at the same time they are also making sure that, in case of need, it should be able to be placed on ready alert at any time.

The cooperative's technology specialists have since developed the original idea further, and they are going to build a social establishment above the shelter, in which they will locate a cafeteria and locker rooms.

The example of the Dunakeszi people provides food for thought, since house factories are operating at an ever increasing number of places where they could also assist in the construction of such emergency shelters.



8584
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CIVIL DEFENSE RELOCATION PROCEDURES OUTLINED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 5, May 77 pp 3-6

[Article by Lt Col Mieczyslaw Szulczynski: "General Principles for the Preparation of Organizational Elements for the Relocation of the Population"]

[Text] Preparations for the relocation of residents of towns considered to be the most seriously threatened are one of the many tasks which civil defense handles in the area of protecting the population from modern weapons. In order to be able to handle these complicated tasks effectively in the event of need, it is necessary right during peacetime to make adequate preparations in this area. Besides the specially prepared plans for relocating the population and planning to make material, technical, medical, and defense-disciplinary provisions, the bodies responsible for conducting this operation should prepare the essential organizational elements well. Efficient relocation will depend to a very great extent on the preparation of these elements. Points for registration and information, loading, assembly, unloading, staging, and dispersal are among the basic organizational elements of relocation.

The registration and information centers are set up on the basis of the administrative offices of places of employment and in the administrative offices of residential buildings (urban ADM [Administracja Domow Mieszkalnych]), garrison housing administrations (GAM), in building exploitation regions (REB), and housing economy enterprises (PGM). In addition, the mayors (supervisors) of towns (city districts) can designate other centers on the basis of which these centers can be organized.

It is the task of the registration and information centers first of all to register residents and employees of the workplace and their families who are to be relocated, to issue relocation cards, to inform residents of the relocation order, and while the relocation is going on to direct the population to loading or assembly points.

Office space, dayrooms, and clubs and so on make the best places for the development of registration and information centers.

In the place of employment the director of the workplace is responsible for the preparation of the registration and information center, and in the ADM, GSM, REB, or PGM the director in charge is the responsible person.

In setting up such a center one should remember that the various quarters should have appropriate numbers and orientation boards with signs telling what the purpose of the room is.

The person designated as the director of the registration and information center should be one who is well acquainted with the area of operation of the ADM, GAM, REB, or PGM, and in the place of employment the director should be well acquainted with the employee situation. The size of the staff serving at the center depends upon the number of people to be relocated.

Part of the personnel in service at the center should be assigned to the writing and issuing of relocation cards, with a certain number appointed to giving information, some designated to maintain order and direct traffic at the center itself, and others to direct the population to the loading station or assembly point.

The loading points are designated for putting the population into vehicles. The directors of the places of employment are responsible for the preparation of loading points, and ADM, GAM, REB, and PGM directors are responsible for handling the relocation of the third group of the population. These points should be planned at stations, railway stops, squares, parks, ports, and stops. Basically, one loading point is set up for 1,000-2,000 people expected to be transported. Within a town, insofar as possible, these points should be set up outside the projected area of destruction with a pressure of 0.3 kilograms per square mile. The points should be served by convenient urban transportation or good street connections for the population to come on foot.

Motor vehicle loading centers are basically set up at the place of employment or nearby, and from there workers and their families are transported directly out of town. It is the task of the loading points first of all to register persons who have arrived at the centers and to collect the "A" stub from their relocation cards, to direct the population to the vehicles in organized fashion, and to assign them places. A group (five to ten) of people is assigned to serve such a point, and it puts people into the various motor vehicles, cars, boats, or other vehicles. Members of the railway station staff should be expected to serve as part of the staff at the loading points set up in railway stations. In addition, a group of people should be assigned to give medical assistance to patients and to aid in handling invalids, elderly people, and mothers with children.

The assembly points are set up primarily by directors of the ADM, from which the population will be transferred out of town, on foot. At these points lines of 50-100 pedestrians are formed, so that they can go to staging points or directly to distribution points. At these points there is

registration of the population, and stub "A" is collected from their relocation cards, just as it is at the loading centers.

The assembly points are set up in squares, in parks, and so on, near the buildings in which facilities such as dayrooms, clubs, halls, offices, and so forth are located.

In order to upgrade the work of this point, a director is appointed along with a group of five to ten persons (depending upon the number of lines created), and this group puts the people into the lines of pedestrians.

In order to transfer people who are incapable of making the march and to carry baggage to each line, the necessary vehicles should be provided for. Each line is given a separate number, and a leader is appointed for the line.

The unloading centers are set up in the relocation area, destination localities or places for the temporary relocation of the population. Directors of workplaces are responsible for preparing these centers, and the civil defense chiefs of the towns and parishes [gminas] which take in the population from the towns considered to be particularly threatened are responsible for the third group of the population. The population transported leaves the vehicles at the unloading point. This point may be staffed by five to ten persons (depending upon the number of arrivals), and this group should see that people are unloaded efficiently and that the population is directed immediately to the dispersal point or directly to the new relocation place and lodging for the employees. It is at these points that the persons who have arrived surrender stub "B" of their relocation cards.

The loading, assembly, and unloading points should have rooms allocated for handling the formalities related to the registration of the relocated population, the issuance and collection of relocation cards, and protection of the population from rain, snow, and frost. To this end dayrooms, clubs, schools, boarding schools, office buildings, and so on are used. At each point or center there should be organized first aid and medical assistance, provision for keeping order and protecting people, a supply of water, and provisions for giving people something hot to eat.

The staging centers are set up in the event there is not an adequate supply of vehicles, the roads are blocked, or it is necessary to transfer people from one means of transport to another, for example, from motor vehicles to railway cars, or vice versa. The population transported is kept temporarily at these centers.

Staging areas should be planned wherever appropriate facilities can be found in which the population may rest.

The staging area should consist of separate places for unloading, the loading of groups, and so on, rooms for handling the formalities related to registration, and rooms in which the population can rest, with medical and sanitary provisions, catering, and provisions for keeping order and protection.

Voivodship civil defense inspectorates determine how many staging areas there will be and where they are to be located. On the other hand, the town and parish civil defense chiefs set up the staging areas. A director and a staff of from five to 30 people are appointed to serve at the staging area. The dispersal points are set up in the area taking in the relocated population.

They are set up to receive, distribute, and direct the population which has been relocated to the places which have been designated to house them. The voivodship civil defense inspectors determine how many dispersal points there will be and where they will be, and the civil defense directors of the towns and parishes taking in the population which has been relocated set up the dispersal points. It is at these points that the population is taken off the vehicles, people arriving are registered and stub "B" of the relocation cards are collected, and then people are informed concerning the principles of their stay in the new lodging and concerning the way they are to receive food, medical assistance, possible employment, and so on.

Dispersal centers are basically set up only for the population put into the third group, but workers of the places of employment, on the other hand, should basically be transported directly to the locality in which they are to be quartered. In considering where to locate the dispersal points, we should have in mind how close they are to the railway station, river port, or roads used by motor transport during the time of relocation and the possibility of using facilities for setting up the dispersal centers. The dispersal center should consist of the following elements:

Unloading place,

Room (facility) for registration, collection of stubs of the relocation cards, and assignment of various families to the locality in which they are to live;

Rooms (facilities) in which to rest;

Place to issue meals;

Rooms for medical and sanitary facilities;

Place to load baggage and transport the population to their quarters.

As needed at the dispersal point provision should be made for setting up posts for personnel keeping order, handling traffic, in charge of fire protection, and detecting contamination.

The main places to look for with a view to turning them into dispersal points in the plan are complexes of buildings for public use, usually found in localities which serve as headquarters for parish officials, for example, houses of culture, schools, clubs, and the like.

A group of people numbering between five and 30, depending upon the number of arrivals being relocated, is appointed to staff the center. The person appointed to head the dispersal center should be one who has organizational

ability and is equal to the task of directing the center. Transportation available in the parishes, mainly using horses, should be readied to take people from the dispersal point to the places in which they are to be quartered (various localities, little villages). All the bodies responsible for preparing the organizational relocation elements should consider the efficient provision for these elements in the relocation plans.

In planning the organizational elements of relocation, we should give particular attention to the capacity of these centers. Work should be so planned and organized at the loading, assembly, unloading, staging, and dispersal points that too great a number of people will not be allowed to gather. The people who have arrived at a given point should not wait to be transported away or to begin hiking out.

The number of people at the loading points should be the number that a train, convoy, or ship can take at one time.


To this end diagrams are drawn up of the various organizational elements of relocation, that is, the registration and information, loading, assembly, unloading, staging, and dispersal points. These diagrams are appendices to the plans for relocating the population from the operating region of the ADM, employees from the places of employment, and so on, and to plans for receiving and locating the population in the parish. A visit should be made to the buildings and quarters, and the water supply conditions and so on should be examined before work begins on drawing up the diagram of the operation of the organizational part of relocation.

The diagram of the organizational element of relocation should include:

- Buildings designated for setting up the center;
- Location of various rooms for issuing cards, registration, rest, serving hot meals and drinking water, and so on;
- Room or area to be developed into medical-sanitary point,
- Place for locating medical-sanitary stations, posts for keeping order, for protection, for handling traffic, for firefighting, for measuring contamination, and so on;
- Place for protecting people against radioactive fallout and so on;
- Place for vehicles to assemble;
- Directions and order in which the population will move and the capacity of the center.

In the free space (margins) of this diagram should be put lists, for example, the list of the center's staff, the list of transport which is designated to carry people and baggage, a list of jobs and materials for adapting the building and rooms for proper use. In addition, lists of duties should be drafted at each point for the various people who have tasks.

The number of persons staffing a given center or point depends upon the capacity of that point. Some of the people staffing certain points should come from the ZOS [Plant Civil Defense Unit] and TOS [Local Civil Defense Unit]. These will mainly be members of the medical-sanitary, fire, social, and other services and from groups of political instructors.



[Key to diagram]

1. Place of residence
2. Registration and information point
3. Motor vehicle loading station
4. Railway loading station
5. Assembly point
6. Motor vehicle unloading station
7. Stage point
8. Distribution point
9. City limit
10. Voivodship line
11. Cable factory
12. Region of location
13. Residential Housing Administration [2, 3, etc]

The personnel staffing the organizational relocation elements should be suitably prepared to carry out their tasks. To this end we see that it is necessary to train these people, in separate programs which cover subjects such as the general principles for relocating people, the principles for developing the centers, and so on, and above all, during the course of the training each person should learn how to do the tasks of the position assigned to him.

It should be emphasized that in planning the relocation of the population, we must carefully draw up plans for the development and operation of the organizational elements of this enterprise. It should also be remembered that the process of relocating people from towns considered to be in particular danger will depend to a great extent on the time it takes to set up these elements and on their effective operation.

10790
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SWISS PAPER COMMENTS ON 'ZAPIS' PUBLICATION

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 12 Jul 77 p 17

[Article by Witold Wirpsza: "'Transcript'--Censorship in Poland"]

[Text] Recently a volume entitled "Transcript I" (in Polish: "Zapis") appeared at "Index on Censorship" in London. In a foreword Stanislaw Baranczak explains the title, which has many meanings in Polish and in the censors' jargon means a ban on the publication of a text; as in German, transcript refers therefore to the duty of the author to write down everything which is of value to him; finally "Zapis" is also a description of the present situation of Polish literature and the limitations to which it is subject.

Seventeen authors took the decision in January to present their censored texts to Polish readers in more than 10 typewritten copies. Some months later "Transcript I" appeared in England in Polish. Lyric poetry, prose, and essays are represented in it--as well as all generations: from the elders, Jerzy Andrzejewski and Antoni Slonimski to the juniors, Stanislaw Baranczak and Ryszard Krynicki.

One should not regard this volume (the next one is already circulating in Poland) as an anthology of Polish underground literature, however; it is not representative enough for that. Besides, many books of older and younger literary figures living in Poland have already been published in exile presses.

Taboos

The collection nevertheless gives us some insight into the operation of the censorship, for it shows us either censored texts or acquaints us with authors who are under a writing ban. At times the almost surrealistic recklessness of the censor can also be noticed, as for example when he deletes the names of Osip Mandelstam or Georg Trakl from the poem by Ryszard Krynicki. There are various levels of this surrealism; but it is the taboos which comprise the core of the activities of the censorship. One can enumerate them quite precisely, adhering to the available texts:

1. Polish nationalism. An essay by Barbara Torunczyk published in "Zapis" about an extreme nationalist group of young Polish poets who were active in the Warsaw underground during World War II was seized in a Polish monthly.
2. The rule of terror. The novel by Jacek Bochenski about Tiberius could not appear in Poland. The chapter available to us describes the activities of executioners: torture, rape and execution of the young daughter of Sejanus.
3. Politological considerations, which bare monocentrism as a power destroying society. That is what happened with an article by Jakub Karpinski.
4. Stalin's person and his relations with literary people. For example the fictitious telephone conversation of Stalin with a Russian poet, in whom one can recognize Boris Pasternak, about another poet, who could be Osip Mandelstam. It is a chapter from the novel "The Pulp" by Jerzy Andrzejewski, which has not been able to appear until now.
5. Genuine religiosity. "Zapis" presents a text by Jerzy Narbutt which derives from this attitude.
6. Description of negative conditions or occurrences which the reader might assume to be inherent in the system. The following were censored: a novel by Jan Komolka (one chapter is published) discussing a prison for youths; a story by Kazimierz Orlos about the disintegration of morals among young people; critical and in part parodistic stories by Marek Nowakowski could not be published at all.
7. Very personal reflections which are already suspect because of their independence. It is precisely for this reason that Kazimierz Brandys is not able to publish his novel "Unreality"; the same applies to Wiktor Woroszyński's autobiographical novel "Literature."
8. Lyric poetry. Here the censorship falls into a paradoxical situation. It really desires a socially and politically neutral lyric poetry, namely the reverse of what was required in the Stalin period, when many authors tried to flee into neutrality. But now poets of the middle and younger generation primarily flee from neutrality into a committed attitude. Individual poems and entire books are confiscated, as in the cases of Barbara Sadowska, Jerzy Ficowski, Stanisław Barańczak and Ryszard Krynicki.

Bans on Publication

In the foreword to "Zapis" one can read that among the authors represented, Jacek Bochenski, the Russian expert Andrzej Drawicz, Marek Nowakowski, Kazimierz Orlos, Kazimierz Brandys and Wiktor Woroszyński are under a publication ban.

A publication ban is both a preventive measure and a punishment at the same time. In contrast to the Stalin period, when, for example, affected persons were permitted to translate under a cover name, the ban is absolute today, although as a rule limited as to time. The author is not officially informed of it; he learns of the measure after his texts have been confiscated totally, even those who were normally "worthy of publication." The procedure applies not to the text, but to the name, which is not "worthy of publication." The poet knows: He was "naughty."

But does "good behavior" belong to the nature of art?

6108

CSO: 2300

YUGOSLAVIA

NAVY OFFICER INTERVIEWED ON MISSILE BOATS

Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Aug 77 AU

[Interview with Comrade Djuric, commander of a missile boat unit of the Yugoslav Navy by Miljusko Tomic--no place or date given]

[Text] Awaiting the jubilee celebration of the Yugoslav Navy, 10 September, the 35th anniversary of forming this service of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, here is a report by Miljusko Tomic on a visit to a missile boat unit:

[Question] Comrade Djuric, please introduce the unit which you command.

[Answer] You are now on a missile boat. These ships are intended to carry out missile attacks on large navy and merchant ships. As you can see, these are not really boats, they are ships which are not only physically somewhat larger, they are ships which have a great striking power, the power of these missiles is such that each of them can sink a large merchant or navy ship.

All of our ships carry on their side the names of people's heroes from all our regions. The ships crews have a special respect for these names of our revolution and, being proud of them, they are developing a [word indistinct] and competitive spirit. For instance, in 1974 and 1975, we were proclaimed the best unit of the Yugoslav People's Army, while in 1976 we were decorated by the supreme commander with the order for military merits with golden swords.

As you can see, the ships are armed with very up-to-date missiles for attack operations and also with modern artillery. No traditional aiming mechanism can be found on the ship, all equipment is controlled from the artillery, missile and other centers which are situated deep within the ship.

The crews of these ships are well chosen. Members of these crews are men of good moral-political qualities and they have a good psychophysical condition which is indispensable for performing their tasks. The new ships require a very high level of professionalism in performing tasks and for this reason the ratio between officers and men is one to one, which shows what professional training is needed to handle the equipment, or rather so that these ships can sail and perform their tasks.

These ships are exclusively for offensive purposes. This is a problem of tactics, this is the only way in which we can carry out our tasks far at sea, before the aggressor reaches our coast. To stop it or to weaken it, or to thwart its intentions.

YUGOSLAVIA

WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON NEW CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SARAJEVO

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Jul 77 p 4

[Excerpts] According to church circles in Yugoslavia, the newly-appointed Archbishop of Sarajevo, Marko Jozinovic, will be installed in August at the cathedral of Sarajevo. Jozinovic, who succeeds Archbishop Smiljan Cekada who died 1½ years ago, is 57 years old and has been provost of the cathedral complex in Sarajevo up to now. He studied theology at the Vatican Gregorian Institute in Rome and also in Sarajevo where he later became professor of moral theology at the advanced theological school.

The archbishop of Sarajevo is also head of the Upper Bosnian church province which includes the archbishopric of Sarajevo, the bishoprics of Banja Luka and he is also head of the Mostar; Skopje-Prizren bishopric.

The church administration in Bosnia-Hercegovina is [relatively] new. Under the Turks Bosnia and Hercegovina had no clergy with connections to the Vatican; the only priests allowed were Franciscans. They lived in close contact with the people and thus enjoyed great trust among the believers, but also separated themselves somewhat from church discipline. When the Austrians took over Bosnia and Hercegovina from the Turks in 1878 the Pope erected bishoprics, a church hierarchy and administration, there.

The Franciscans then lost their pastoral monopoly. Lack of caution by Rome and also the new church administration over the Franciscans, as well as stubbornness and defiance on the part of the Franciscans who felt themselves displaced, and the devotion (sometimes to the point of fanaticism) of the church members who also were defiantly inclined have since then kept the relationship tense between the Franciscan Order there and the Vatican.

In the last few years there have even been violent outbreaks. The new archbishop of Sarajevo and Metropolitan of the Upper Bosnian church province is faced here with a difficult task.

CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM, RELIGION DISCUSSED AT CROATIAN SAWP MEETING

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jun 77 p 6

[Speech by Dr Dusan Dragosavac, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the LCC [League of Communists of Croatia]]

[Excerpt]. It was specifically before the CSCE that we witnessed a human rights campaign, which in reality was nothing but an expression of competition between blocs and bloc-type positions. The bearers and inspirers of this campaign were those reactionary forces which try to get the most out of the CSCE and do what is necessary to exploit it most efficiently. Peace, however, has gotten the most out of the CSCE. This is how it was established and this is the manner in which it is understood by us and by the other progressive forces, so that it is necessary to view it as a whole, with all its realities. We were never of the opinion that we, or for that matter anyone else in the world, have perfected democracy, but rather that human rights and freedoms must be developed, perfected, etc, which is what we are constantly doing.

However, it has turned out that a part of our reactionary clergy and certain nationalists are not concerned with this but are trying in several ways to arouse interest for a problem in Yugoslavia regarding certain aspects of human rights and freedoms, communications with abroad, etc. These things are, of course, rather transparent, and they did not excite us very much, nor should they excite us. They do, however, indicate that some of our forces are still trying to act from the point of view of other systems, primarily from an exploiting, outmoded class system and its remnants, which is ready to place itself in the service of various enemies as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, and such service is what they have in common. Naturally, nationalism as well comes to the fore here, through various manifestations and with various harbingers.

We must be aware of this and not let it confuse us, which is why those questions covered by Comrade Kardelj during the last Executive Council are essential, and we must study them along with the Law on Self-Management, because this is a question of long-term problems and solutions, particularly those which must even today be realized in the most successful manner possible. This is all the more urgent because certain individuals are grasping at certain parts of

the argument taken out of context and are interpreting them as they please. Various liberals think that it was in their favor, nationalists think it was in theirs, etc. and that, consequently, this gives them freedom for their activities. There will doubtless be others who will naturally attempt to exploit it. In reality, it is a question of the very essence of the development of democracy in the interest of socialism, the working people, of the strengthening and stabilizing of this country.

Therefore, we as communists, and the Socialist Alliance in particular, as well as all others must study this thoroughly and get a good grasp of it. It is in this sense that one must understand the question of democratic centralism in the League of Communists and democracy in the League of Communists, since it is impossible to do it otherwise. It is in this sense that one must understand and develop this scope of the Socialist Alliance, because this is the place for the broad spectrum of the working people. This is how the discussions and clarifications of positions, etc. must be understood, since, naturally, those who act in an organized antisocialist manner are the ones to draw any consequences for views which are not generally accepted.

We must also be constantly aware of the unity of the League of Communists, as well as of our other sociopolitical forces, and of the unity of the nationalities and of further development of brotherhood and unity. This is what gave us significant results both during the war and during the post war rebuilding. Whenever we grew lax in this respect, even for a moment, in any sector, it backfired on us and led to crisis situations in the society.

It has already been said that this year we are celebrating significant jubilees. This is the 40-year anniversary of Comrade Tito's becoming the head of the party while, at the same time, it is another great jubilee when it is a matter of Croatia and not only Croatia--the forming of the Communist Party of Croatia. It is a period when our worker's communist movement, after a long period of wandering and seeking, established a correct program, when it placed the national problems correctly, naturally, in connection with social problems. It was then that the communists in all of Yugoslavia, and Croatian communists as part of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, snatched the national banner from the hand of the bourgeoisie and affirmed nationality and nations, in general, in both Croatia and Yugoslavia as a whole. This was a basic prerequisite for the successful struggle against nationalism of the worst kind, genocidal, Frankist-Ustashist as well as the Chetniks and various other sorts. This was a basic prerequisite for the successful struggle against unitarian and separatist concepts as well. This is a problem which is still a current one before us, and I would say that today it has certain significant aspects of its own. In certain socialist countries the problem of socialist nationality is frequently stated, so as to insure the hegemony of the strongest nationality in each country, and, I would say, the assimilation of smaller nationalities is administratively expedited, which naturally, cannot bring the desired results and only strengthens nationalism. When, where and how will this take place? It is a known fact that in certain of these countries nationalism exploded drastically, and, then, third parties intervened drastically, since the local forces were unable to control the situation, and we

know how destructive these interventions were for the workers' movement and communism. The task of affirming nationality and its values is still before us. However, we must naturally affirm only those values which have been positive, since in each nationality there have been progressive and reactionary forces which have struggled--and, I would say, are struggling today and will continue to struggle in the future. Therefore, we are in favor of affirming the positive aspect ourselves and will not allow anyone to take over from us, not even on specific points. In that way we will be more successful against everything that is negative and against nationalism in each nationality. It is well known and correct that in Croatia--we are talking of Croatia now--we snatched the national banner, both Croatian and Serbian, of our nationalities in Croatia, snatched it from the hands of the bourgeoisie, because the bourgeoisie was not capable of solving the national problems. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie, before the war and particularly during World War II, led the nationalities and nations into destruction; it bound itself to fascism. Today, it promises nothing except for ties to another reactionary support, etc. However, it is just as true that on certain points we still leave room for others to act. We must free ourselves from [inferiority] complexes here as well. We, the Communists and working people of Croatia need not have any [inferiority] complexes about the war period or the period before the 21st meeting of the Executive Council of the LCY. On the contrary, we must, starting from everything positive that has been accomplished by the League of Communists, by the communist party, affirm it, so that the League of Communists may repel the pressures from various other forces, to neutralize them and truly reduce them to an insignificant number of the worst among the nationalists, so that we may be more successful in the struggle against them.

It is especially true today, when we are talking about the 40th anniversary of Tito's becoming the head of the party, that I would like to remind everyone of Tito's constant concern. When we follow his appearances, his public speeches and even his individual encounters--be it with the people or with individual managers--two elements are constant: his concern for the peoples' unity and the unity of the League of Communists. A prerequisite for the peoples' unity is surely the unity of the League of Communists, and vice versa. This encompasses a struggle against everything that disturbs such unity. Thus, it encompasses the struggle against nationalism, regardless of its markings.

Looking at it from this point of view, Comrades, I would say that we have, after the 21st meeting, a more open manifestation of a portion of the reactionary clergy, which is in our parts mostly Catholic, but when we talk about Yugoslavia, it also encompasses a part of the Orthodox clergy in Croatia. It manifests itself in certain other parts as well. I am talking here, primarily, of the reactionary clerics, and I make the distinction between them and the majority of priests. What is the problem? If you follow their press, or a portion of it, so that I will not generalize, you will see that they defend the most reactionary tendencies that have existed in our nationalities throughout history. Certain things that would drive any normal man to shame are brought to light and defended there. This includes those genocidal acts that were practiced by some of those circles during the war, as ideologists of fascism or in some other manner. There is praise, during certain sermons,

of certain persons convicted as war criminals. We do not need to, nor are we pointing this out for historical reasons, since those who are raising these issues are doing it not for historical reasons but rather as current activity, for the sake of the present and the future, and we must likewise remind you of this, not only for the sake of the past but also for that of the present and future. I would like to issue a warning that we have had such manifestations on several other points, always in areas where we have not been consistent, where we have not been present. These things manifest themselves and will continue to do so, since we must harbor no illusions that we have accomplished everything with the 21st meeting, with the Tenth Congress of LCY and the Seventh Congress of the LCC and all of our other endeavors, that with this alone we have created conditions under which nothing inimical, not even nationalism, can manifest itself. On the contrary, there are still conditions in our society, which are frequently an expression of our inefficiency, inconsistency and weakness and which may be material or either internal or consist in connections abroad, and they are naturally ideological or political--[all of] which make it possible for these things to continue to manifest themselves. It is because of this that, in our preparations for the congress starting from these questions and Comrade Tito's concern for the unity of the nations and nationalities, we must, so to speak, constantly keep a watchful eye, but in such a manner as to truly affirm that which is truly national, while struggling against the various nationalisms.

I do not wish to expound any further on what I have already said about a certain attitude in dealing with the question of nations, things national, etc. Follow our press and you will see how differently it treats our celebrations. You will see how regionalism dominates in a certain portion of the Croatian press, through its treatment of [military] units and incidents during the People's Liberation War, and how Croatia [as a whole] is forgotten. Compare how a part of our press reported Stane Dolanc's speech in Makarska. It was reported in such a way that the part where he spoke of the question of national affirmation so that we may struggle more successfully against nationalistic manifestations was successfully omitted. I am pointing this out so that we may be more sensitive to the national questions and the affirmation of the nation and, among other things, so that we may be more successful in the struggle against nationalism.

I would now like to say a few words regarding the discussion about the representatives of the religious organizations. Our armed struggle and the postwar rebuilding would not have been successful had we not established a broad program accepted by all the citizens, not only by the workers and peasants but by the other strata as well, by the vast majority of the population. We would not have been successful had this not corresponded to the historical moment and the historical tasks, and naturally, if the theists had not participated en masse, alongside the atheists, that is to say, the nonbelievers and the believers. Neither the League of Communists nor the Yugoslav Communists have ever made a distinction along those lines. We must never make this distinction in the future. We must, instead, treat all of our citizens equally, as producers and self-managers, regardless of whether they are theists or atheists. One should not confuse this with the League of Communists' pro-

gram, with Marxism, in which there can be no coexistence with other idealist ideologies (which, of course, includes religion) and one should not confuse this with the fact that society demands just such a coexistence and equality of people of varying world views, which means both atheists and believers. Therefore, I believe that the Socialist Alliance should be more aware of this, because it has problems in this area. We must consistently put into practice the constitutional principle that in the sphere of religion, religious ceremonies, etc. the church is, as it were, supreme and that our social organizations will not become involved in it, and accept all the implied consequences; but, on the other hand, that part of the Constitution which also states that church organizations may not become involved in state and social spheres, we must insist that this be carried out to the letter. But, by the same token, we must make sure that our citizens-believers, theists and, to add immediately, priests, are granted their civil rights to the letter. We have written this into the Constitution not as an empty phrase but because we intended to have it fully implemented. However, the anticommunist, I would even say neo-fascist portion of the clergy, which tries to instigate a war between the theists and the atheists must be separated from this. Those atheists who use administrative measures to act incorrectly toward the believers, theists, fall into the same category with the reactionary clergy. This is because we start from Marx' position that religious wars were reactionary and feel that clashes between theists and atheists would be hardly more progressive. We deal with the various forms of alienation, including religious alienation, differently and we need no administrative measures. We will intervene, as we have always intervened, whenever one of our governmental sociopolitical organizations fails to adhere to the Constitution and the regulations. It would be very good, and, in my opinion, there would be hardly any insurmountable problems, if the church were to do likewise, that is, if it would condemn at least that which is worst, nationalist, or if you will, neo-fascist, that surfaces in a portion of the religious press and in some of the sermons. We must be consistent in all these things. It is in this sense, it seems to me, that we will have to get the Socialist Alliance involved more than ever before.

9110

CSO: 2800

PAPER SCORES THEORETICAL WORK ON BOURGEOIS CONCEPTS

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jun 77 p 11

[Review by Nenad Ivankovic: of the book "Marx i jugoslovenska'sveta porodica" (Marx and the Yugoslav Holy Family) by Zivojin D. Denic, Jedinstvo Publishing House, Pristina]

[Text] Had Zivojin D. Denic, instead of writing a book, literally copied a few pages from any of Marx' works--which, for that matter, he has done with the title of Marx and Engels' work "Die heilige Familie" (The Holy Family) of 1845--he would have performed a function of at least some value. As it is, all the value his alleged criticism of the petty bourgeois structure of a portion of Yugoslav political thought has begins and ends with the title page, while everything that follows (422 pages), were it to contain merely philosophical pretensions, surely would not merit the attention of even an uninformed reader. Thus, Denic did not only wish to "criticize heaven"--to quote his terminology: to criticize "the speculative thought of Yugoslav philosophers"--but he was particularly concerned with the "criticism of earth"--or as he would phrase it more elegantly: the criticism "of Yugoslav petty bourgeois social conditions"; this book, consequently, in view of the specific political application, surely merits a review.

Before we turn our attention to Denic's "subject matter," it would not be amiss to say something about the structure of the book itself.

In order to accomplish the task he set for himself, which reflects itself in a "criticism of everything that exists," in Yugoslavia, he divided his polemical work into two parts, of course: In the first three chapters he presents his positive viewpoint, which is one of the coarsest varieties of the theory of reflection and vulgar Marxism, while in the remaining four chapters he lectures nine thinkers. He begins with those who, according to his classification and terminology, philosophize from "positions of the petty empirical bourgeoisie," and they are Gajo Petrovic, Veljko Korac, Predrag Vranicki, Rudi Supek and Mihailo Markovic. The group philosophizing from a "position of economic technocracy" comprises

Vanja Sutlic, Vojan Rus and Davor Rodin. Finally, Dimitrije Sergejev philosophizes from a "position of political bureaucracy."

To be sure, we are not against any relevant philosophical criticism of the above-mentioned thinkers, which means a criticism of adequate quality which, with [respect to] its philosophical position, transcends the object of its objections. In Denic's case, the exact opposite is the case, that is, the criticism falls deeply below the level of that which it purports to critically analyze.

In the first chapter, entitled "Early Works and the Truth About Marx' 'Theory of Alienation,'" Denic announces--with the very title--his intent to tell the world finally the truth about that which, up to now, has been the subject of speculative errors. Thus, he does not refrain from criticizing Marx himself, for, according to Denic, there is no such thing as a theory of alienation, because--still according to Denic--the theory of alienation is mere bourgeois fiction. On page 28 Denic writes offering a strange interpretation of Marx: "Therefore, the alienation of work from the worker himself has as content--that is, real existence--the whole of capitalist social relations which, in addition to the cited relationship on one hand, contains another part as well within the framework by which, from the capitalist's viewpoint, the entire capital truly manifests itself as the product of truly another's work (meaning not his [the capitalist's]). In other words, that which from the 'point of view of labor' (worker's) manifests itself as a process of alienation, from the 'point of view of the capital' (capitalist's) manifests itself 'as a process of appropriating another's work' (318). /The complete truth has two sides to it, that is, it is produced, in this case, by the capitalist social relations; therefore 'the theories of alienation'--were they even to represent a real alienation--are necessarily one sided and abstract and cannot transcend the bounds of ordinary descriptions of empirical facts, which, as we have seen, can be a real analysis or a philosophical dissecting of lifeless abstractions"/ (emphasis by Z. D. D.).

In the context of the entire chapter, as well as the quoted passage, Denic somehow conceptualizes the thing under discussion, to simplify it a little, as an alienation of the worker because the products of his work do not belong to him but are alien to him. However, what Denic wishes to demonstrate is that the capitalist possesses everything that is alien to the worker, and so it follows that he cannot, under any circumstances, be alienated. Since, in this world, there are not only workers but also capitalists, the alienation theory is one sided, because, according to Denic, it does not reflect the complete social relationship (capital--labor), but only one side--labor itself, that is, the worker's position.

To state the sort of thesis that Denic has stated indicates an inability to approach Marx from the viewpoint of the structure of his thought, in the sense that certain of Marx' statements bring one to face that which is fundamental in his thought. Marx' well known thought about [certain]

men who can be very comfortable in an alienated state testifies to this, and it was this very thought that led Denic astray and which he quotes to justify himself. It is perfectly superfluous to try to prove that being comfortable in an alienated state and not being alienated are not one and the same thing.

However, the basic reason for Denic's delusion is that he is not completely clear on fundamental Marxist concepts, particularly on the concept of labor. Were it otherwise, Denic would know that "labor does not produce goods alone; it produces itself and the worker as goods, in relation to how much goods it produces" and that "the fact that a man's very essence is alienated from him means that one man is alienated from another, just as each of them is alienated from human essence" and that finally "everything that manifests itself with regard to the worker as outward manifestation, [i.e.], alienation, manifests itself with regard to the nonworker as outward manifestation, [i.e.], alienation" (Marx; "Otudjeni Rad" [Alienated Labor] RR Naprijed, ZGB).

Zivojin Denic's Imputations

We discussed Denic's first chapter merely in order not to confine ourselves to mere statements about his philosophical irrelevance. Now that this has been accomplished, it will suffice to show how the irrelevance of his positive thought includes the irrelevance of his criticism, i.e. the second portion of his book.

However, let one example be witness to our statement. By criticizing Vanja Sutlic's book, "Praksa rada kao znastvena povijest" [The Practice of Work as Scientific History], Denic classified the author, as we have pointed out above, as an economic technocrat, even though it should be clear to anyone who has read the book that it was written exactly as a criticism of the technocratic world because of the consistency in drawing conclusions. This is [true] regardless of whether the book is otherwise evaluated positively or negatively and regardless of whether or not one accepts certain statements. Again, Denic's error comes from the fact that he does not understand the main point of the book, which is best attested by page 316 of his book, where he asks himself what is the third thing that, according to Sutlic, stands between man and nature, and answers "that the 'third' thing standing between man and nature is the subject of history, [that is], human society." So much for this. We are pointing out to the less well informed that the famous third thing in Sutlic's book is work and not, as Denic would have it, human society.

Criticism of the Earth

It is now necessary to answer the main question: After all, regardless of his choice of authors, why did Denic attempt to criticize our philosophical thought? Was it because he had been stimulated by a pure philosophical Eros? Not at all. In the foreword to his book Denic already

announces his motive: "Our analysis embraces the concepts of nine philosophers and theoreticians, whose thought originates and exists within the framework of petty bourgeois social positions. It is to be understood that we do not maintain that the structure of petty bourgeois consciousness is exhausted by this. On the contrary, we feel that it is far more coarsely and evidently present in the political, economic, sociological and some other consciousnesses." Accordingly, Denic did not engage in his criticism of philosophy because petty bourgeois consciousness is present only in the works of the criticized philosophers, but, to the contrary, because it is present everywhere in our self-managing society, only "far more coarsely and evidently," so that he, as befits a true critic, turned his attention to the best part, which is also the least evident and which is, in this sense, of paradigmatic importance.

In order to explain the appearance of these distorted forms of consciousness Denic writes: "To be sure, the more undeveloped the class and social conditions are, the more fundamental the sources of speculative consciousness" and "if the speculations of post-Hegelian German philosophers are a caricature of Hegel's speculations, then the speculations of Yugoslav philosophers are caricatures of caricatures." In order to explain what this means, Denic turns for assistance to Marx and Engels' opinion of the relationship between German social conditions and speculative philosophy and writes the following: "As we have already pointed out in pertinent places in this study, Marx, together with Engels, thinks that the German petty bourgeois social conditions were, in the framework of the bourgeois world, a real 'breeding ground' for philosophical speculations on the theme of man, i.e., human society." A few lines further down Denic states that he is talking about the "whole of German social conditions" and immediately adds, writing about Hegel's philosophy as bourgeois ideology, that "it was no longer necessary to the developed bourgeois entities of England and France, but it was necessary to the undeveloped German conditions as a substitute for their real shortcoming." (pp 415-417)

Now it is necessary to pose a question in Denic's manner, that is to say, from a position of the theory of reflection: Who needs these speculations that are caricatures of caricatures of the speculations or post-Hegelian German philosophers? The answer comes on its own--only those social positions which are a caricature of German social conditions of 150 years ago and only as a substitute for a real insufficiency. When things are viewed from such a perspective, a decision may be reached about Denic's "message," which can be summarized in the following thesis: Since there is no true Marxist thought--even in Yugoslav philosophy--which is proven by Denic's "criticism of heaven," it cannot exist in social practice either, which is proven by the implied "criticism of earth." Therefore, Denic concludes his book with the following words: "In any event, the far greater problem of overcoming this 'practical' and stronger petty bourgeois structure is before the Yugoslav society. Among all the possible petty bourgeoisie, the philosopher and his speculations are the most harmless and are the least 'expense' for the working people." (p 422) (?!)

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

FEW WOMEN IN POLITICAL SYSTEM--There is a disproportionate number of women in the self-management political system. Women account for 22.5 percent of all delegations elected in 1974 and convened up to now, while they account for 30.5 percent of the delegations from associated work. In delegations of local communities which deal with most of the (day-to-day) problems of living (from child care to care of the elderly, etc.) women account for only 9 percent, and for 2.4 percent of the members of local community councils. There is not one woman among the 517 representatives of opstina and city assemblies, and women account for somewhat less than 6 percent of the directorate positions in the economic and social [health, education, welfare, etc.] sectors. Women share as follows in the leaderships of the following federal-level sociopolitical organizations: LCY Central Committee (11 percent), the Federal Conference of SAWPY (16 percent), the Socialist Youth Federation of Yugoslavia (24 percent), the governing council of the Trade Union Federation (about 22 percent), SUBNOR (Federation of Veterans Associations of the National Liberation War) (about 10 percent). The participation of women in the executive organs of these organizations is even more unfavorable. Of the 32 members of the FEC (Federal Executive Council) only two are women, and there are only two women among the 14 judges on the Constitutional Court and the 14 judges on the Federal Court. [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jul 77 p 5]

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END